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Table of Acronyms 
Table 1 List of acronyms used in this paper and their full expression  
Acronym Full expression 
ACFA Aged Care Financing Authority 
ACFI Aged care funding instrument 
ACSA Aged and Community Services Australia 
AIHW Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
CACP Community aged care package 
CBO Community benefit organisation (religious, charitable or community based) 
CDC Consumer directed care 
CPI Consumer price index 
DAP Daily accommodation payment 
DoHA1 Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 
DVA Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
EACH Extended aged care at home package 
EACHD Extended aged care at home dementia package 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
EBITDAR Earnings before Interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation and rent  
FP For-profit 
GPFR General purpose financial reports 
GT Grant Thornton 
HACC Home and community care program 
IRR Internal rate of return 
LLLB Living Longer Living Better 
MPIR Maximum permissible interest rate 
NFP Not-for-profit 
PBD Per bed day 
NPBT Net Profit Before Tax 
PBY Per bed year 
PC Productivity Commission 
RAC Residential aged care 
RAD Refundable accommodation deposit 
ROA Return on assets 
ROE Return on equity 
ROI Return on investment 
RRR Required rate of return 
WACC Weighted average cost of capital 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Portfolio responsibility for aged care has moved from DoHA to the Department of Social Services under the 
recent change of government. 




Definition of commonly used terms 
Table 2 Definition of terms used in this paper 
Terms used Definition 
Allocative 
efficiency  
Allocative efficiency is achieved when resources are allocated so as to 
maximise the welfare of the community (Palmer & Torgerson 1999). In 
relation to aged care services, allocative efficiency is achieved when the 
allocation produces the combination of health and aged care services that 
best meets users’ demands and results in an efficient overall level of aged 
care spending (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 96) 
Charitable An organisation that intends social value or utility to the general community 
or an appreciable section of the public, and that is not established primarily 
to provide profit, gain or benefit to its individual owners or members.2  
Client Generally a client is a person who receives paid care (often called the care 
recipient) but may also be the carer of a care recipient where the carer is in 
receipt of services from a funded service provider. 
Community based An organisation formed for a particular common purpose by members of an 
identifiable community based on locality, ethnicity or some other identifiable 
affiliation, whose activities’ may be carried out for the benefit of its members 





Collectively, these are community based, religious and charitable 
organisations that do not seek to make a profit from their activities, 
previously referred to as not-for-profit (NFP3) organisations. 
Consumer A consumer of services may be a person receiving formal care, the carer of a 
person receiving formal or informal care or a person making an enquiry 
about the receipt of care 
Consumer Directed 
Care 
‘CDC is a way of delivering services that allows consumers to have greater 
control over their own lives by allowing them to make choices about the 
types of care they access and the delivery of those services, including who 
will deliver the services and when.  Under a CDC approach, consumers are 
encouraged to identify goals, which could include independence, wellness 
and re-ablement.  These will form the basis of the Home Care Agreement and 





An amount paid by a care recipient towards their accommodation costs in a 
residential aged care facility calculated on a daily basis (Aged Care Financing 
Authority 2013). 
EBITDA (R) Refers to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (and 
rent). It gives an indication of how much profit or surplus an organisation 
makes with its present assets and current operations. It is a standard 
measure of the current operational profitability of the organisation.  
Formal or paid 
care 
This is care provided by a person who is paid to provide that care generally 
by an organisation in receipt of government funding but the person may also 
be paid directly by the person receiving care or their carer 
 
                                                          
2
 The definitions of local and state governments, not for profit, for-profit, religious, community based and 
charitable were sourced from the DoHA (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2009). 
3
 The term not-for-profit, or NFP, is used in this paper where there is a direct quote from the original source 
which used this term or the context requires that this terminology is used.  




Terms used Definition 
For-profit A for-profit organisation is one which operates primarily for the financial 
profit or gain of its owners, members or shareholders. For-profit 
organisations include private incorporated bodies that are registered by the 





The GPFR are provided annually to the Department of Health and Ageing by 
residential aged care providers as part of the eligibility requirements for the 
Conditional Adjustment Payment (CAP) under the Aged Care Act 1997. They 
are not a complete set of data for the industry. 
Informal care This is care provided to a care recipient by a person who is not paid to 
provide that care and generally includes family, friends and neighbours of the 
person receiving care 
Internal rate of 
return 
The IRR is the discount rate that is used in capital budgeting to measure and 
compare the profitability of investments. It is also called the rate of return 
(ROR) and when applied to savings and loans the IRR is also called the 
effective interest rate. The term internal refers to the fact that its calculation 
does not incorporate environmental factors such as the market interest rate 
or inflation. When it is applied to estimation of the net present value of a 
stream of payments from an investment it returns a value of zero (0).  
Living Longer 
Living Better 
LLLB is the name given to the Australian Government’s Aged Care Reform 
Package announced in April 2012 in response to the Productivity 
Commission’s Report - Caring for Older Australians.  The new Coalition 
Government has branded their future aged care platform as Healthy Life, 
Better Ageing. 
Local government A body established for the purposes of local government by or under a law of 
a State or Territory1. 
Maximum Possible 
Interest Rate 
The MPIR is the interest rate calculated in accordance with subsection 
23.3(2) of the User Rights Principles 1997. It is used in calculating interest 
applicable on the day after the resident should have been refunded their 
accommodation bond balance or entry contribution balance in accordance 
with the legislated timeframes or Formal Agreement (Australian Government 
Department of Health and Ageing 2013b). 
Net Profit Before 
Tax 
The NPBT is determined by revenue minus expenses except for taxes (Aged 
Care Financing Authority). 
Not-for-Profit A not-for-profit organisation is one which does not distribute operating 
surpluses for the profit or gain of its individual owners or members; whether 
these gains would have been direct or indirect. This applies both while the 
organisation is operating and when it winds up. The Australian Taxation 
Office accepts an organisation as not-for-profit where its constituent or 
governing documents prevent it from distributing profits or assets for the 
benefit of particular people1. 
Opportunity cost Is the value of a benefit forgone in the process of adopting an alternative 
policy, course of action, etc., which can be taken to be a cost of the 
alternative adopted (Macquarie Library & Butler 2012) 
Productive 
efficiency 
Productive efficiency refers to the maximisation of outcomes for a given cost, 
or the minimisation of cost for a given outcome. If a different type of input or 
combination of inputs can achieve the same or better outcomes for the same 
cost then it will have superior productive efficiency.  








An amount paid as a lump sum by a care recipient for their accommodation 
costs in a residential aged care facility (Aged Care Financing Authority 2013). 
 
 
Religious  An organisation whose objectives and activities reflect its character as a body 
instituted for the promotion of religious objectives and the beliefs and 
practices of whose members constitute a religion1. 
Resident The term resident refers to a person who permanently or temporarily resides 
in a residential aged care facility 




ROI is a measurement of how efficiently an organisation allocates its capital. 
It is expressed as a percentage; for example, an organisation with an ROI of 
15% has created, for the year in review, 15 cents of income for every $1 of 
capital invested. Organisations with an ROI greater than their WACC are 
creating value for their owners; conversely those with an ROI below their 
cost of capital are losing their owners value. 
Service provider This is the organisation that is providing an aged care service and who 
receives a payment either from the government, another funder or the care 
recipient or carer to provide care. Service providers in receipt of government 




Includes State or Territory Government authorities, instrumentalities and 
local health authorities established under State or Territory legislation1. 
Sustainability Sustainability is the combined viability of aged care services within the 
sector, or parts of the sector, to the level that the numbers of providers 
continuing to operate are sufficient to enable the sector to continue 
functioning to a level that will achieve social and financial objectives that are 
acceptable to the community or have been agreed. 
Technical 
efficiency 
Technical efficiency refers to the relation between resources (capital and 
labour) and outcomes and is achieved when the maximum possible 
improvement in outcome is obtained from a set of resource inputs. A service 
is technically inefficient if the same (or greater) outcome could be produced 
with less of one type of input (Palmer & Torgerson 1999).  
Viability Viability refers is the financial capacity of an organisation to provide 
sufficient financial return to satisfy the requirements of the operators to the 
extent that the owners or operators of the organisation are prepared to 
continue to operate the service both in the short and long term. The 
determination of the viability of an organisation may be based on its current 
operational performance measured by its EBITDA or its project return on 
investment.  
Weighted average 
cost of capital 
WACC is the rate of return against the initial investment that an organisation 
is expected to pay, on average, to satisfy its security holders. It is the 
minimum return that the organisation must earn on an existing asset base to 
satisfy its creditors, owners, and any other providers of capital (Wikipedia 
2013). It is particularly useful for decision makers to assess the capacity of 
the organisation to meet the expectations of investors (from both debt and 
equity) using the expected future available income that can be used to repay 
the cost of the investment. It is calculated taking into account the relative 




Terms used Definition 
weights of each component of the capital structure and requires a number of 
assumptions to be made concerning risk and the expectations of investor. 
 






This report examines the financial viability of the Australian aged care sector at the beginning of the 
LLLB reforms and identifies issues that will impact on its sustainability in the future. The Aged Care 
Financing Authority estimates that the residential aged care sector will require investment of $25 
billion in the coming decade to cater for demand for aged care from Australia's ageing population. 
The viability of individual providers - whether they be for-profit providers (37% of all providers) or 
community benefit organisations (CBOs) (62% of all providers) - and the ability of the sector as a 
whole to meet growing demand for aged care at a price, quality, and proximity that is acceptable to 
the community, requires providers to be able to achieve sufficient profit or surplus such that they 
can draw that level of investment into the sector.  
Analyses of the current viability and the future sustainability of the sector by the Aged Care 
Financing Authority (2013), KPMG (2013a, 2013b, 2013c) and by Deloitte Access Economics, Allen 
Consulting, Grant Thornton, Stewart Brown, and Bentleys, are clouded by the lack of uniformity of 
financial performance indicators across different publications. Indicators include EBITDA(R), 
profitability measured in earnings, average weekly earnings per bed per year, average return on 
assets (ROA), return on investment (ROI), average net worth/equity per resident, internal rate of 
return (IRR) and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as well as Net Profit Before Tax (NPBT). 
The ACFA reports that only 70% of providers were profitable in 2011-12 and 16% had a negative 
EBITDA, with EBITDAs per bed year across the sector ranging from –$3,646 to $21,081 for the 
financial year 2011-12, with major variations in profitability and viability according to location, 
facility size, wealth client profile, care type, state and provider type (FP or CBO). While the most 
financially viable services are predominantly for-profit facilities of 61-100 beds with mostly high care 
beds in metropolitan Australia, there were high performing facilities and providers in all locations 
and service categories. In all income bands, the EBITDA achieved by the top quarter of facilities is 
three to five times higher than the average. 
Improving Trend in Viability 
KPMG find, based on analysis of the Department of Health and Ageing’s (DoHA's) general purpose 
financial reports (GPFR), that while 30% of providers made a loss in 2011-12, profitability is 
recovering from the downturn associated with the GFC. In the 12 months to April 2013 total value of 
aged care building work was $1.2 billion compared to $823 million in the previous year (an increase 
of 45%). These analyses of the current knowledge of viability suggest the following issues face the 
sector.  
Issue 1 – consistency in agreed measures of viability 
There is significant variability in the way that indicators of financial performance are measured and 
reported for annual returns. Should there be a consistent measure of financial viability agreed 
within the sector and endorsed by the ACFA for the future reporting of financial viability of the 
residential aged care industry? 
  




Issue 2 – an agreed level of performance for a sustainable sector 
The Inaugural Report by ACFA suggests that the Authority does not appear to be concerned by the 
fact that 30% of all residential aged care facilities were not profitable, nor that for-profit providers 
demonstrate higher financial performance on a number of indicators than CBOs although CBOs are 
the majority of providers. While it is to be expected that in any year a number of providers will not 
be profitable for a variety of reasons there does not appear to be a consensus on what is an 
acceptable percentage of unprofitable services in a sustainable sector. What is the acceptable 
percentage of providers with negative profits or low EBIDTAs for the sector as a whole to be 
assessed as sustainable; and under what conditions should unprofitable facilities be supported to 
continue operating? 
Issue 3 - Data limitations for assessing viability and sustainability 
The assessments of viability and sustainability provided by the different reports analysed in this 
paper are based on different data making it difficult to compare findings. While the largest dataset is 
the centrally collected GPFR data supplied by the Department of Health and Ageing and analysed by 
KPMG. Is there a need for a national minimum data set on financial indicators that will provide 
reliable and consistent indictors of viability and sustainability while protecting the confidentially 
of the data on individual operators?  If there is such a need, this national minimum data set needs 
to be delivered within the broader context of an overall reduction of red tape in the sector. 
Issue 4 – Identifying the reasons for large variations in financial performance  
There is significant variability across the sector in the financial performance of different services. The 
best performing services are not just marginally better, but significantly better than the average 
performing services and this variation is unexplained with current knowledge. In addition, there 
appears to be significant variability in financial performance across operators in both the short and 
long term. Is there a need for a much closer examination of the reasons for the difference in 
financial performance between the highest quartile and the lowest quartile to determine the 
extent of the differences due to structural or management factors?  
Issue 5 – improving the performance of the lowest quartile 
The facilities in the top quartile of financial performance could be used as examples to poor 
performers where other factors are equal. The challenge appears to be to encourage the poor 
performers (in both quality and financial performance) to raise their performance to the same 
standard as the viable performers. What can the sector do to encourage and assist poor performers 
to improve their performance? 
  




Issue 6 – Services in outer regional, rural and remote locations 
There appears to be variation in financial performance based on location – both between states and 
territories and by degree of remoteness. As services in outer regional, rural and remote locations 
tend to be smaller on average they may face structural financial challenges because of their location 
and size that may not be completely overcome by the current reforms to financial arrangement. Is it 
acceptable to the Australian community to have a two tiered system, based around location, 
where services based in cities and major regional centres have a greater opportunity to be 
financially viable and sustainable in the long term while those in rural and remote locations are 
financially insecure?  Do different funding arrangements flow from this situation such as the use of 
block funding in rural and remote locations? 
Issue 7 – structural change to outer regional, rural and remote services 
Long-term solutions to the challenges faced by RRR services may be around structural changes 
(multi-purpose services, consolidation of ownership, etc.), and increased financial supplements; or a 
combination of both. What are acceptable solutions to the challenges to performance faced by 
many (but not all) RRR services? How do we support services with identified community benefit 
but which have little if any chance of being financially viable over the long term? 
Issue 8 – variation based on the size of services 
There may be variation in financial performance based on the size of facilities. How do we achieve a 









To be sustainable into the future the aged care sector will need to attract new capital investment. 
The accepted theory of investment is that organisations with an IRR greater than their WACC will 
attract investment. Deloitte Access Economics (2011a) estimated that for high care the average IRR 
is 2.4% and the WACC is 9.8% (25 year investment), and for low care the IRR is 8.4% and WACC is 
8.6%. On these numbers they argue that there is no incentive for investment in either type of bed. 
Deloitte Access Economics report that investors are demanding a 12% rate of return.  
Estimates by other analysts give a similarly bleak picture of sector sustainability, hence the 
importance of getting the accommodation payments settings right under LLLB. Deloitte Access 
Economics (2013) estimated that the daily accommodation payment (DAP) required to break even 
(in the base case of 50% of people using the refundable accommodation deposit (RAD) option) is 
$61.37 and $64.42 where all accommodation revenue is derived from DAPS. They estimated the 
average RAD size under the base case 50% scenario at $361,689, noting that providers are permitted 
to increase the price of accommodation to compensate for loss of income (interest and retentions) 
from reduced RAD balances, including for 'increased cost of debt'. 
The key question is whether these arrangements will create a level of return on investment 
sufficient to create a sustainable system. KPMG (2013a & 2013b) and ACFA (2013) conclude that 
while the new arrangements 'may reduce the value of new RADs from low care and extra service 
residents by $402.8 million in 2014-15' (KPMG 2013a, p. 11), RADs for High Care will provide HC 
providers with 'the opportunity to increase their lump sum accommodation payments by $3.4 
billion', resulting in 'increased income and avoided cost of debt from new RADs and DAPs from high 
care residents' of $93.5 million in 2014-15 (KPMG 2013a, p. 11) with further income benefits 
thereafter (p. 12). They estimated that there will be a significant increase in persons paying 
accommodation charges above the maximum government accommodation subsidy of $52.84 from 
virtually no one to about 36% (p. 48). 
However, they also conclude that low care providers, small providers, regional rural and remote 
(RRR) providers, and providers with a high proportion of supported residents will not significantly 
benefit from these changes (p. 12). This analysis suggests that the following issues related to 
sustainability appear to face the sector.  
Issue 9 - impact on small and RRR providers of the three tier bands of accommodation charges 
Will the proposed bands of accommodation payments create a three tier (or two tier) system, 
with varying degrees of financial viability and quality, that may make it difficult to attract 
providers to rural and remote locations?  Will there also be a problem for older facilities that they 
will have to charge lower rates due to sub-optimal facilities and therefore enter a downward 
income spiral that will not support 'substantial refurbishments' and new facilities? 
  





Issue 10 – Impact of the proposed accommodation charges 
The proposed accommodation payments to be introduced in 2014 may have the result that those 
sections of the industry that are able to levy an accommodation charge at Level 2 or Level 3 will 
generate an income sufficient to be sustainable. It is also possible that those beds that levy an 
accommodation charge at Level 1 for places in two-bed rooms will generate an income above the 
estimated break-even price Table 10. These changes are likely to have a significant and lasting 
impact on the sector and should be introduced carefully. Is there a consistent view among 
providers that while the proposed accommodation payments may enable providers to operate 
viable services that meet consumer preferences and create a financially sustainable sector the 
significance of the change is such that it should only be introduced after future analaysis is 
completed on the full impact of the change? 
Issue 11 – expected income generating life of a residential aged care facility 
The estimates of the WACC appear to be very sensitive to the expected useful life of a RAC facility 
(see Table 8. above). Is it reasonable to expect that facilities 30 years old will no longer be able to 
generate an income and what is a reasonable expected income generating life for the purpose of 
estimating WACC and other financial performance indicators? 
Issue 12 – balancing quality and financial performance 
The available data on performance and sustainability of the sector appears to be based entirely on 
an assessment of financial metrics. There is no attempt in any of the reports reviewed to balance 
financial performance, financial viability or system sustainability with quality of care and outcomes 
for residents, or with community expectations or objectives. These financial estimates appear to 
make the assumption, but it is not explicitly stated, that all operating RAC service are of equal and 
acceptable quality. There appears to be a significant gap in our knowledge of the relationship 
between financial performance and of quality and between staffing levels and quality. How do we 
strike a sensible balance between the measures of financial performance with the measures of 
quality so that we can judge the cost of quality and variation in quality between provider types? 
  




Improving viability through administrative and allocative efficiency 
Accreditation systems and compliance regulatory (police checks, etc.,) have been identified as 
imposing significant and avoidable regulatory burdens on aged care providers and consumers alike. 
The PC argued that promoting more competition would promote better practice, lessening the 
reliance on regulation to ensure high quality services. The move towards CDC is expected to add 
another layer of costs; however analysts have provided no estimate of the magnitude of these costs, 
and the issue requires investigation if only because it has an impact on perceptions of industry cost 
regimes and viability, and therefore on investment. 
Sustainability of the entire care system for older Australians can be measured by the system's ability 
to respond to demand. One measure of this is the delay in entry to care. While there appears to be a 
lengthening of times from assessment to entry, the data is weak and does not indicate local, regional 
or jurisdictional variation.  
Another measure of responsiveness to demand is extended hospital stays for persons waiting for 
aged care. The proportion of 'aged care type' patients occupying acute care hospital beds has 
declined since 2005, which suggests that access to RAC has improved, though the trend is not 
jurisdictionally uniform. The following issues remain within the industry in relation to administrative 
and allocative efficiency.  
Issue 13 – the cost benefit of regulatory compliance 
Based on our current knowledge neither the benefits to residents and clients, nor the financial cost 
of regulatory compliance is currently known with any certainty. Consequently the impact on 
efficiency and the viability of the sector is unclear. What is the real benefits to consumers, what is 
the real cost to providers, consumers, and what is the cost benefit to the community of the 
current regulatory and compliance burden on the industry? 
Issue 14 – measuring access to care 
In a system of care that relies heavily on funding from taxation there is a reasonable expectation 
that indicators of access and allocative efficiency will be agreed and measured. Is there consensus 
on what is an appropriate wait for access to care and does it serve as a benchmark for the 
allocative efficiency of the residential aged care system? 
Issue 15 – measure of regional access to care 
Current indicators of access to care do not report performance at the regional level. Should we have 
publicly reported and agreed measures of access to care on a jurisdictional and regional basis as 
an indication of local allocation efficiency, and access to care by different categories of providers, 
rather than rely on aggregated national and jurisdictional analysis? 
  





The LLLB reforms will see the roll out of a four-tier Home Care Packages program and a basic 
assistance Home Support program based on the current HACC program. The viability of the HCP 
program is a function of operational costs and care staff costs. Financial results for the average 
provider of CACPs have been declining since 2006 and the impacts on viability of the extension of 
CDC also remain uncertain. The following issues are facing the home care sector. 
Issue 16 – cross subsidisation of community and home care services 
The complex mix of community and home care services suggests that many have a high level of 
support from governing bodies and related services. Should we require community aged care 
services to be financially viable as stand-alone services or is it a reasonable expectation that they 
will always require cross subsidisation by the provider from resources (buildings, equipment, 
management and systems) and assets that are funded by other services (residential aged care, 
HACC etc.)  If there is cross subsidisation, it is possible that tighter prudential requirements may 
call this into question.   
Issue 17 – impact of CDC financial viability of home and community care services 
There is the potential that the implementation of CDC will change the level of cross subsidisation 
within services and between services because of the requirement to quarantine funding to individual 
clients. There appear to also be an increased administrative cost generated by the creation of 
individual budgets and regular individual financial reports.  
What level of cross subsidisation is acceptable or desirable from both a financial viability and a 
community viability viewpoint – will cross subsidisation be possible with CDC? 
What is the impact of CDC on the financial viability of community aged care services through the 
increased administrative and transaction costs and through the limits on cross subsidisation?  
  




Option for the future 
Government financing and funding policy should aim to produce a viable, sustainable and efficient 
aged care sector which achieves: 
 equity in the distribution of services 
 reasonable choice for consumers 
 technical efficiency 
 quality care 
 investment in appropriate technology 
 a balance between quality and cost and between government funding and consumer co-
payment that is acceptable to the community 
 an integrated and stable mix of acute, community and residential care. 
A sustainable sector can only be achieved through a funding and financing model that: 
 allows service providers to generate sufficient surpluses and profits to maintain their 
viability and continuing operations  
 encourages continuous investment for long term sector sustainability. 
The current system shows wide variation in the financial viability of providers such that some are 
producing surpluses much higher than the average while others are not generating a surplus. 
Depending on the consumer preference for the DAP and the RAD the changes to the funding for 
accommodation may achieve long term sustainability for some sections of the industry only. 
The following options address issues raised here. Each is discussed in detail in the report 
Option 1: Establish acceptable benchmarks to measure viability and sustainability. 
Option 2: Create a publicly available, de-identified, universal, national data set to enable 
assessments of quality and financial performance 
Option 3: Encourage early assessment of the impacts of the LLLB reforms 
Option 4: Determine the reasons for the variability in financial performance across similar and non- 
similar providers. 
Option 5: Improve efficiency in operations 
Option 6: Investigate mechanisms to improve and sustain the viability of services in outer regional, 
remote and very remote services 
 
  




Introduction and Background 
The purpose of this paper 
This paper is produced by Aged and Community Services Australia (ACSA) to aid in the discussion of 
major policy issues during the current period of aged care reform. Its purpose is to stimulate debate 
by providing a summary of the ideas currently in the public domain, and new ideas, concerning the 
financial viability of aged care providers and the financial sustainability of the industry, or parts of it. 
The current Living Longer Living Better (LLLB) reform process is moving rapidly and the intention 
with this paper is to inform and stimulate the discussion between decision makers at the level of 
government, service providers, consumers and workers.  
Scope of this paper 
This paper is focused on the issues of financial viability of residential and community aged care 
service providers and the sustainability of the residential and community aged care sectors4.  
Background 
The Productivity Commission (2011) has predicted that by 2027 there will be a need for 287,000 
residential aged care beds (up from 184,570 in 2012) and about 976,000 HACC individual client 
services (up from 518,000 in 2007). Similarly the Aged Care Financing Authority (ACFA) (2013)5 
estimates that the residential aged care sector will need to build 74,000 additional beds over the 
next ten years. They estimate this investment will cost $25 billion (including replacement and 
refurbishments). The PC estimates are provided in Table 3.  
Table 3 Australia: estimate of the number of persons aged 65 year or older receiving care by the nature of the care  
Year 2006-07  2016-17  2026-27  2036-37  2046-47 
Number of places/persons ‘000 ‘000 ‘000 ‘000  ‘000 
High care residential 108 148 205 303 405 
Low care residential 58 60 82 122 162 
Total residential 167 208 287 426 567 
Community aged care places 31 50 71 100 125 
Home care services 518 697 976 1251 1448 
Source: (Productivity Commission 2008, p. 38) 
As illustrated in Table 4, the OECD has estimated that Australia will face a higher growth in demand 
for long term care expenditure and subsequent investment than the USA, Canada and OECD 
countries in Europe and approximately the same as New Zealand until 2025. Overall growth is a 
combination of demand-driven expenditure due to the increasing aged population and cost-driven 
expenditure due to the increasing cost of providing care for the aged. 
  
                                                          
4
 However, it does not include consideration of the viability of community care services that are funded 
through the HACC program. 
5
  In including these data in its report the ACFA does not cite or reference any publicly available reports from 
the department in which these data are included.  




Table 4 Average estimated growth of long term care expenditure, 2006-25 and 2025-2050: Source: (OECD 2011)  
 
As residential aged care services are predominately provided by non-government organisations 
(both for-profit and community benefit organisations) these organisations will only continue to 
provide them on a long term basis if it remains financially viable and, preferably, profitable, for them 
to do so. However, a number of recent reports have suggested that the aged care system was not 
viable in the long term under the pre LLLB financial parameters. The LLLB is the Australian 
Government’s framework for reform of the sector. It incorporates a number of short term and long 
term reforms to the sector. In view of the growing demand and the reported tenuous viability of the 
sector, it is essential that the governments selects the policy options that will enable existing service 
providers and groups of service providers to remain viable in the short to medium term, and create 
the parameters that will achieve long term sustainability of the sector as a whole. In addition to the 
actions of governments there may be actions that can be taken by individual providers or groups of 
providers, to improve their own viability and the sustainability of the industry, such as increasing 
their management skills to improve efficiency, return on investment and quality. 
  




Concepts of viability and sustainability 
This section canvasses the concepts of viability and sustainability and the meanings that different 
analysts have applied to these terms. 
Viability 
For the purpose of this paper there are three ways to approach the issue of viability: 
 viability of an individual provider 
 viability of a category of providers; such as those of a particular size, targeting particular 
groups or operating in particular locations 
 the viability of all providers. 
Hogan (2004, p. 98), in his report on pricing arrangements in residential aged care, tends to use the 
term ‘viability’ to refer to individual providers. For example, in discussing the bed allocation process 
he reviewed 'whether the allocation would improve the viability of an aged care service through 
restructuring’ and noted that ‘lending institutions are as interested in the competence of board 
members as they are in the financial viability of facilities’. Hogan also uses viability to refer to a class 
or group of services, such as in recommending the continuation of the viability supplement for rural 
and remote providers, viz, ‘the viability policy must only be to ensure that people in remote areas 
and from special needs groups have access to care’ (2004, p. 193).  
KPMG also use the term viability to refer to an individual provider by defining a viable residential 
aged care provider as one that ‘can retain and attract investment by offering rates of return 
commensurate with risk, and mitigate impacts from negative external economic and financial 
conditions’ (KPMG 2013a, p. 42). 
The Productivity Commission uses the term viability to refer both to individual providers and to the 
sector as a whole as in the sentence ‘However, the transition [to a more competitive market] must 
be orderly, to ensure the ongoing delivery of safe, quality care to older people and the viability of 
the aged care industry, while not protecting individual providers’ (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 
xxxiv). On the other hand the report on ‘The viability of residential aged care providers’ by Deloitte 
Access Economics (2011b) focuses on providers, yet the main thrust of the report is on the sector as 
a whole. 
In this paper, provider viability is defined as the generation of sufficient profit or surplus such that 
an individual provider of aged care services is willing to continue to provide services, albeit the 
parameters of what defines sufficient profit will differ according to organisational mission.  
 For-profit (FP) service providers require a return on investment that will enable them to pay 
an acceptable level of return to their owners (commensurate with the risk of their 
investment) after appropriate business costs.  
 Community Benefit Organisation (CBO) service providers require a return on current and 
future investment to maintain acceptable financial reserves for future investment after 
acceptable business costs and to meet their community objectives.  
 State and Local government providers require an income from the Australian government 
and co-payments from consumers that meets their budgetary parameters and political 
goals.  




Providers may also be prepared to operate services at different levels of viability. They may seek to 
secure sufficient income from parts of their aged care services (either residential or community) to 
enable them to finance those aspects of their aged care service that may not be financially viable 
(either temporarily or for the long term) but are socially responsible (such as in particular locations 
or for particular target groups). This is particularly the case in those situations (such as remote 
locations or services for particular groups) that will never achieve financial viability but are provided 
by a CBO organisation as part of their mission and role.  
Sustainability  
When referring to the whole aged care sector, Hogan tended to refer to the ‘sustainability’ of the 
industry (2004, p. 157). The Productivity Commission (2011, p. 97) recognises four types of 
sustainability; fiscal sustainability, provider sustainability, workforce sustainability and social 
sustainability 6. 
Aged care sector sustainability is important to the broader health services industry, and the 
community generally, due to the integrated and complementary nature of aged care and health 
services and the potentially high cost to society if these services did not exist, are not reliable, or do 
not function efficiently. Frail and disabled aged Australians receive care from both residential and 
community care services which are complementary; should one of these sectors become 
dysfunctional due to financial pressures then it will have a significant impact on the other. The acute 
health care sector is dependent on the responsiveness of the residential aged care sector to take 
over the care of aged persons who cannot be sent home from hospital. A failure of the residential 
aged care sector to meet the demands for care for these inpatients will have upstream impact on 
the efficiency of the public hospital system. Similarly, services funded through other programs such 
as HACC, housing, welfares services and disability services may also be negatively impacted by an 
unsustainable aged care system. 
The aged care sector contributes to social sustainability by providing care of an agreed standard to 
the frail and disabled aged at an acceptable cost and enabling the community to allocate its 
resources in an efficient way that best meets the needs of Australian society. The existence of aged 
care services enables families and carers to contribute to society confident that the aged person of 
concern is receiving a level and quality of care they alone may not or could not provide. A failure of 
                                                          
• 
6 ‘Fiscal sustainability — the extent to which financing arrangements can accommodate projected 
changes in the number of older Australians (in absolute and relative terms) requiring care over the 
longer term and changes in the value [cost] of that care. 
• Provider sustainability — the financial viability of aged care providers in the long term. Under current 
arrangements, aged care providers operate within a highly regulated environment and the design of 
regulatory and funding arrangements should not undermine the financial viability of providers or 
distort signals for new investment. 
• Workforce sustainability — the ability of the aged care industry to attract and retain people with the 
requisite skills needed to provide the level of quality care expected by the community. This dimension 
of sustainability focuses on whether future models of care are able to be supported by the available 
workforce. 
• Social sustainability — the ability to maintain social harmony within the community concerning the 
fairness of the distribution and use of available resources.’ 




the aged care system would have a significant impact on the lives of numerous families and, 
consequently, on the economic productivity of the Australian economy.  
Finally, the explicit cost of care for the increasing number of frail and disabled aged is now an 
identified and significant component of the economy and, as the Productivity Commission’s recent 
report recognised, the community has an expectation that these resources will be managed 
efficiently. 
Getting the best ‘value’ out of the resources devoted to providing care and support to older 
Australians is also important for taxpayers and for the community more generally because it is 
about maximising overall welfare and living standards. This requires that resources are used 
where they give the greatest benefit (allocative efficiency), and that services are produced using 
the lowest level of resources required to meet a specific quantity and quality standard (technical 
efficiency). It also requires that investments are made where the stream of future benefits more 
than outweighs the costs, including the opportunity cost. Another dimension is how aged care 
services interact with other services that are critical to the health of older Australian, including 
health, housing and transport services. (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 93) 
 
These definitions of viability and sustainability are also adopted by the Aged Care Pricing Authority in 
its inaugural report where it states that ‘the ongoing viability of residential aged care providers is 
essential to meeting the objectives of a sustainable sector and to support the delivery of quality care 
by an appropriately skilled workforce’ (Aged Care Financing Authority 2013, p. 24). 
  




Analysis of the current situation 
No new analyses have been commissioned to prepare this paper. This section is based on previously 
released and publicly available data and brings together the concepts of viability and sustainability, 
measures of, and recent assessments of, financial performance, and the assessment of the likelihood 
of future viability and sustainability.  
There have been several reports and publications on the viability of residential aged care providers 
in recent years. The most recent report expresses a view of the sector at the start of the LLLB 
reforms (Aged Care Financing Authority 2013; KPMG 2013b). The focus, method and major findings 
of these reports and publications have been summarises in Appendix 1.  
There are fewer analyses of the viability of community aged care services than for residential aged 
care services; however, some reports make reference to a range of issues associated with 
community aged care services.  
This section firstly examines the viability of recent and current operators7. It then examines the issue 
of future investment. Some of the reports considered here focus on combined income and costs of 
both care and accommodation (Bentleys (Qld) Pty Ltd 2012; Stewart Brown and Co 2013). Others 
restrict their analysis of overall viability to future capital investment (Deloitte Access Economics 
2011a; Grant Thornton 2011) excluding the contribution (loss or surplus) that operations (care 
provision) make toward overall profit or surplus.  
While the terminology used within these reports is reasonably consistent there is the potential for 
some confusion in attempting to compare them and comment are made in the discussion below 
where this may occur. Measures of financial performance that are used as indicators of viability and 
sustainability across different publications include: 
 earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) with some variations 
(Aged Care Financing Authority 2013) 
 profitability measured in earnings (Bentleys (Qld) Pty Ltd 2012; Shonhan 2013; Stewart 
Brown and Co 2013)  
 average weekly earnings per bed per year (Ansell 2012),  
 average return on assets (Aged Care Financing Authority 2013) 
 Average net worth/equity per resident (Aged Care Financing Authority 2013) 
 the internal rate of return (Access Economics 2009; Deloitte Access Economics 2011a; Hogan 
2004),  
 the weighted average cost of capital (Access Economics 2009; Ansell 2012; Deloitte Access 
Economics 2011a; Hogan 2004).  
None of the papers provides any substantial discussion of the viability of the community care sector. 
                                                          
7
 With the exception of the recent report by KPMG (KPMG 2013a) a number of these reports appear to assume 
that operators require all of their services to be financially viable, all the time, to continue to operate them; 
however, this may not necessarily be true of all community benefit organisations and all government operated 
services. 




Viability of current RAC providers 
Overall Financial performance 
A common and comparable measure of the financial performance of residential aged care facilities 
across reports is earnings before income tax depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). The level of 
EBITDA vary from one year to the next and a poor performance in one year may not necessarily lead 
to a conclusion that a service or sector is not financially viable over the medium to long term. To 
form a medium term picture of the viability of RAC services it is necessary to look at reported 
profitability across a number of years.  
In his ‘Pricing Review’ Hogan (2004) estimated that the EBITDA average for his sample of 781 
facilities in 2002 was $2,001 (equivalent to a return on investment (ROI) of 5.1%). Subsequently 
Bentleys (2006) reported an EBITDA of $2,610 per high care place (ROI of 2.2%8) and $3,288 for each 
low care place (ROI 2.7%) for the FY 2004/05; and $3,671 for high care (ROI 2.2%) and $4,686 for low 
care in 2006/07 (ROI 2.7%). They commented that these results were a substantial improvement on 
previous years. However, by 2009 the Stewart Brown aged care survey reported an average negative 
EBITDA of -$1460 across all facilities (Stewart Brown and Co 2012), although this negative result was 
short lived. In June 2011 their survey indicated an EBITDA of $4,745. More recently they reported 
the ‘average facility’ EBITDA was $7,621 for the FY to June 2012 and $7,166 for the twelve months to 
December 2012. Bentleys’ reports an average EBITDA of $8,015 for the FY to June 2012 (Shonhan 
2013).  
Stewart Brown estimate that 72% of all facilities in their survey to June 2012 made an overall surplus 
which was higher than 2010 (63.5% of all facilities), however, they also report that 14.8% of facilities 
had a negative EBITDA in the June 2012 quarter. This is similar to the results of an analysis of the 
general purpose financial reports (GPFRs) of 1,054 providers by KPMG (2013a) and reported by the 
ACFA. The ACFA reported that 70% of providers were profitable in 2011-12 and 84% had a positive 
EBITDA (2013, p. 9). These analysts reported9 an average EBIDTA per resident across all providers of 
$9,274 with a range from -$3,646 to $21,081 for the financial year 2011-12. These estimates, by 
KPMG on behalf of ACFA, of the dollar value of EBITDA are noticeably higher than the other 
benchmarking reports based on survey data for the same period. Table 5 details for comparison the 
recent reports of the dollar values of estimated average EBITDA for the four most recent reports and 
illustrates considerable variation in performance, presumably as they are based on different samples 
of services.  
The ACSA has previously argued in submissions to the ACFA that the reduction in ACFI subsidy level 
effective from 1 July 2012 will have an unknown impact on the viability of the sector and the full 
impact of that reduction will not be known until the results on the financial performance of the 
sector for the whole of 2012/13 are available. 
  
                                                          
8
 This ROI is based on Bentleys estimate of the value of the capital cost for one place (either high care and low 
care) but they do nor report if this is historical value or current value.  
9
 KPMG comment on the limitations of the GPFR data, viz : it is incomplete as not all providers supply data, the 
data supplied is inconsistent in quality and level of detail, providers with multiple services may not allocate 
costs consistently across their different businesses, and there are inconsistencies in the treatment of balance 
sheet items such as bonds.  




Table 5 Estimate of annual average earnings  




$6,725  $4,896 Estimated actuals for 2010 and 
EBITDAR 
$32,203 (tax payers) 
26,523 (non-tax) 
  Estimated ‘adequate return on 
investment for combined cost 
of capital and care’ 
Stewart Brown 
(2012) 
 $7,166 (average) 
$7,450 (overall) 
 EBITDA on ‘average’ facility 
YTD Dec 2012 
 $7,621 (Average) 
$7,994 (overall) 
 EBITDA on ‘average’ facility FY 
2011-12 
Bentleys (2012)  $8,022  2011-12 national averages, all 
homes, based on EBITDA of 
$21.98 per day 
Shonhan (2013)   $12,080  EBITDA per place of the typical 
aged care provider  
Shonhan (2013)  7.82%  Net profit margin 
KPMG (2013a) $10,364 $5,812 $2,454 $9,274 (all providers) 
$13,121 (FP providers) 
$8,176 (NFP providers) 
-$1,508 (government 
providers). Estimates are of 
EBIDTA based on an analysis of 
1,054 GPFR reports for 2011-
12. 
 
Variation in financial performance by location 
It is reasonable to expect that not all RAC services will return the same level of financial performance 
and one factor may be location. Location may have an impact on financial performance because of 
the different costs of providing services and the varying levels of incomes and wealth of residents in 
different part of the county. Hogan found significant variation in aggregate performance measured 
by EBITDA across the states – with the highest EBITDA in Tasmania and the lowest in Victoria (which 
he attributed to the high proportion of state government operated facilities in Victoria) (2004, p. 34). 
More recently the Stewart Brown survey reported that facilities in Victoria had the lowest level of 
financial performance for the six months to December 2012, however, due to the small sample size 
in that state the authors caution against giving too much weight to the results. Bentleys have 
consistently reported variations in financial performance between states. 
Hogan reported also on the variation in performance on EBITDA within geographical locations 
(capital cities, other metropolitan locations, remote and rural) and reported there was evidence of 
high performing facilities in all locations including small rural services. The survey results by Bentleys, 
Stewart Brown and Grant Thornton tend not to report variation in financial performance by location.  
KPMG (2013a) report that ‘regional’ providers had an average EBITDA of $6,663 compared with 
$10,369 for ‘metropolitan’ providers, although they note that some regional providers appeared to 
generate ‘large’ profits, although they do not provide details to support this claim. They also report 
growth in average EBIDTA across all facilities of 18% between 2006-07 and 2011-12 compared with 
growth of 14% in regional locations across the same period. 




Variation in financial performance based on size 
Hogan reported differences in financial performance based on the size of the facility (number of 
beds) and found facilities in the 61 to 90 bed range performing best (but this may have been due to 
a weakness in his sample). Stewart Brown survey report for FY 2011/12 reported that facilities in the 
60 to 80 bed range had the highest EBITDA at $23.07 per bed day ($8,419 for a year) followed by 
those in the 80 to 100 bed range at $22.05 ($8,097). The least performing group were those with 
more than 100 beds producing an EBITDA of $20.13 ($7,386). On the other hand Bentleys report that 
in 2011/12 the most profitable bed size was 100+ with an EBITDA of $23.79 per bed day ($8,683 for 
a year) followed closely by facilities in the 61 to 80 bed size range at $22.92 ($8,365). They report 
that the worst performing facilities were in the ‘less than 40 beds’ group. These findings on the 
performance by bed size are consistent with the conclusions of Grant Thornton (2009) who argue 
that the bed size of 76 to 100 beds is the most profitable and those with fewer than 25 beds the 
least profitable. 
Unexplained variation in overall financial performance 
Hogan (2004) concluded that while there was a proportion of residential aged care facilities with 
negative EBITDAs, and others that were marginal, there were examples in almost all types of RAC 
services (based on size, ownership and location) that reported a viable surplus or profit. This 
variation in performance across facilities appears to have continued in the years since Hogan 
reported.  
From their survey, Bentleys found that in 2011/12 the top 25% performing facilities, based on 
EBITDA, had net income after expenses of $25.93 per bed day ($9,464 per bed year) and that this 
result was three times higher than the average performing facility ($8.86; $3,233). Similarly Stewart 
Brown reports on the differences in the performance of the top quartile within each of the five 
bands (based on income) into which they divide their sample. Within all of the bands the value of 
the EBITDA achieved by the top 25% is between three and five times higher than the average. They 
observe that the difference in performance between the highest performing quarter of services and 
the average performers was approximately $850,000 for the year (using an 80 bed facility in Band 5 
– the Band with the highest average income) (Stewart Brown 2013). 
Variation based on ownership type 
The analysis by KPMG of the profitability of the industry suggests a higher EBIDTA on average for FP 
providers compared with CBOs. Although FP providers tend to have lower occupancy rates 
compared to CBOs (90.4% compared with 94.7% (KPMG 2013a, p. 87), they represent 62.1% of all 
providers in the top quartile of EBIDTA performance in 2011-12 although they are only 37.2% of the 
total of providers (KPMG 2013a, p. 44). 
  




Trends in the overall assessment of viability 
Table 6 below is reproduced from the recent KPMG report commissioned by the Aged Care 
Financing Authority (ACFA) and reports their assessment of the trends in the viability of the sector 
based on their analysis of the general purpose financial reports (GPFR). While this Table indicates a 
number of favourable trends and the findings of this report indicate higher levels of EBIDTA than 
other reports, it is important to note that 30% of providers made a loss in 2011-12 and 16% had a 
negative EBIDTA. High care providers appear also to generate more cash from operation than low 
care providers. Amber indicates some trend in a favourable direction, green as having improved and 
red as not improved.  




Table 6 Indicator of measures of viability used by KPMG 2006-07 to 2011-12 
Indicator Is the trend in viability 
improving? 
Has viability improved in the 
last year of measurement? 
Profit and loss account indicators 
EBITDA per resident per annum - Sector ● ● 
EBITDA per resident per annum – Regional 
providers ● ● 
EBITDA per resident per annum – Low care 
providers ● ● 
Providers reporting profit ● ● 
Providers reporting negative EBITDA ● ● 
Balance sheet indicators 
Average bond per resident ● ● 
Bonds as a proportion of total financing ● ● 
Equity as a proportion of total financing ● ● 
Return on equity ● ● 
Source: KPMG (2013a, p. 43 table 4.1) 
 
  




Issues arising from the analysis of financial performance 
A number of issue are suggested from the analysis above which should be addressed in the interests 
of continuing viability across all sectors of the industry. These issues are listed below.  
Issue 1 – consistency in agreed measures of viability 
There is significant variability in the way that indicators of financial performance are measured and 
reported. Should there be a consistent measure of financial viability agreed within the sector and 
endorsed by the ACFA for the future reporting of financial viability of the residential aged care 
industry? 
Issue 2 – an agreed level of performance for a sustainable sector 
The Inaugural Report by ACFA suggests that the Authority does not appear to be concerned by the 
fact that 30% of all residential aged care facilities were not profitable, that for-profit providers 
demonstrate higher financial performance on a number of indicators than Community Benefit 
Organisations although CBOs are the majority of providers. While it is to be expected that in any 
year a number of providers will not be profitable for a variety of reasons there does not appear to be 
a consensus on what is an acceptable percentage of unprofitable services in a sustainable sector. 
What is the acceptable percentage of providers with negative profits or low EBIDTAs for the sector 
as a whole to be assessed as sustainable; and under what conditions should unprofitable facilities 
be supported to continue operating? 
Issue 3 - Data limitations for assessing viability and sustainability 
The assessments of viability and sustainability provided by the different reports analysed in this 
paper are based on different data making it difficult to compare findings. While the largest dataset is 
the centrally collected GPFR data supplied by the Department of Health and Ageing and analysed by 
KPMG. Is there a need for a national minimum data set on financial indicators that will provide 
reliable and consistent indictors of viability and sustainability while protecting the confidentially 
of the data on individual operators? 
Issue 4 – Identifying the reasons for large variations in financial performance  
There is significant variability across the sector in the financial performance of different services. The 
best performing services are not just marginally better, but significantly better than the average 
performing services and this variation is unexplained with current knowledge. In addition, there 
appears to be significant variability in financial performance across operators in both the short and 
long term. Is there a need for a much closer examination of the reasons for the difference in 
financial performance between the highest quartile and the lowest quartile to determine the 
extent of the differences due to structural or management factors? 
  





Issue 5 – improving the performance of the lowest quartile 
The facilities in the top quartile of financial performance could be used as examples to poor 
performers where other factors are equal. The challenge appears to be to encourage the poor 
performers (in both quality and financial performance) to raise their performance to the same 
standard as the viable performers. What can the sector do to encourage and assist poor performers 
to improve their performance?  
Issue 6 – Services in outer regional, rural and remote locations 
There appears to be variation in financial performance based on location – both between states and 
territories and by degree of remoteness. As services in outer regional, rural and remote locations 
tend to be smaller on average they may face structural financial challenges because of their location 
and size that may not be completely overcome by the current reforms to financial arrangement. Is it 
acceptable to the Australian community to have a two tiered system, based around location, 
where services based in cities and major regional centres have a greater opportunity to be 
financially viable and sustainable in the long term while those in rural and remote locations are 
financially insecure? 
Issue 7 – structural change to outer regional, rural and remote services 
Long-term solutions to the challenges faced by RRR services may be around structural changes 
(multi-purpose services, consolidation of ownership, etc.), and increased financial supplements; or a 
combination of both. What are acceptable solutions to the challenges to performance faced by 
many (but not all) RRR services? How do we support services with identified community benefit 
but which have little if any chance of being financially viable over the long term? 
Issue 8 – variation based on the size of services 
There may be variation in financial performance based on the size of facilities. How do we achieve a 
system where facilities are all of a size that achieves financial viability while also responding to 
client preference? 
 
Sustainability of the current system 
Deloitte Access Economics (2011b, p. 29) defined the RAC sector as sustainable if it could attract 
new capital investment. The PC (2011) noted that the (then) current accommodation charge was too 
low for long term sustainability and argued that the (then) current system was not sustainable as 
evidenced by a lack of investment in some areas, particularly in high care services. The PC enquiry 
recognised that FP providers are disadvantaged compared with CBOs (NFP) providers through a 
number of taxation arrangements especially the differences in the treatment of Fringe Benefits Tax 
(FBT) between the two sectors (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 126).  
  




Return on investments 
There are a number of estimates for return on investments used by those reporting on RAC services. 
These estimates include: 
 return on investment (ROI); which is generally estimated based on the EBITDA per bed for 
the year in review as a percentage of the investment in that bed 
 return on assets (ROA); used by Stewart Brown but not defined and by KPMG as 
EBIDTA/Total Assets 
 return on equity (ROE); defined by Bentleys as the rate that equity investors will receive and 
by KPMG as the EBIDTA/Net Worth.  
The results of recent assessments of ROI, ROA and ROE are provided in Table 7. Over much of the 
past decade estimates of the ROI across the RAC sector have ranged between 2.7% and 6.19%. The 
recent estimates of ROA and ROE report by KPMG (2013a) appear to report higher performance 
than the reports based on industry surveys. KPMG argue that the relative high ROE by FP providers 
compared with CBOs and government providers is a result of their greater reliance on debt and 
accommodation bonds. They also assess that the increase in the ROE across the sector in the five 
years to 2012 is a result of the decrease in equity as a proportion of total financing and conclude 
that there is uncertainty about the optimal mix of equity within the sector.  
Table 7 Recent estimated returns on investment of the RAC in Australia  
Report Mean estimated ROI/ROA/ROE Comments 
Bentleys 2004/05 (2006, p. 6) 
2.2% (high care) 
2.7% (low care) 
ROI based on capital cost of: 
High care $120,000 
low care at $120,000 
Bentleys 2006/07 (2008, p. 5) 
2.2% (high care) 
2.7% (low care)  
ROI based on capital cost of: 
High care $175,000 
low care at $175,000 
Access Economics (2009) 
3.1 (20 Years) to  
6.19 (30 years) 
ROI  
Stewart Brown (2012, p. 1) 
3.8% (December 2012) 
4.25% (June 2012) 
ROI  
Shonhan (2013) [Bentleys] 
2.85% ROI 
6.57% ROE 
KPMG (2013a, pp. 85-8) 
5.5% (2011-12) all providers  ROA [range -1.9% to 11.2%] 
15.9% (2011-12) all providers  ROE [range -4.7% to 35.2%] 
7.4% (2011-12) FP providers ROA [range -1.2% to 11.7%] 
53.2% (2011-12) FP providers ROE [range 46.3% to 60.8%] 
5.1% (2011-12) CBO providers ROA [range -1.2% to 10.4%] 
11.7% (2011-12) CBO providers ROE [range -3.1% to 19.5%] 
-0.8% (2011-12) Govt. providers ROA [range -4.1% to 13%] 
-0.7% (2011-12) Govt. Providers ROE [range -0.7% to 21.2%] 
 
  




Assessments of the WACC 
There has been a great deal of interest in the calculation of the WACC for residential aged care in the 
past couple of years. This reflects concerns over the adequacy of the income generated by future 
accommodation charges and from refundable accommodation deposits (RADs) to meet the future 
cost of capital investment. WACC is the rate of return against the investment that an organisation is 
expected to pay, on average, to all its security holders. It is calculated taking into account the 
relative weights of each component of the capital structure and requires a number of assumptions 
to be made concerning risk and the expectations of investor. 
A comparable measure of investment is the internal rate of return (IRR). The IRR is calculated by 
estimating the rate at which the net present value of all future cash flows (both positive and 
negative) is zero (0). The accepted theory is that organisations with an IRR greater than their WACC 
are creating value for their owners. Similarly it has been argued that the RAC sector is unsustainable 
when the average IRR is less than the average WACC (Deloitte Access Economics 2011a) (Access 
Economics 2009). 
Table 8 provides the estimates of the IRR calculated by Deloitte Access Economics. A key variable 
used by Deloitte Access Economics is the expected useful life of the RAC facility; 20, 25 and 30 years. 
Using these parameters they estimated that the IRR will range between 0.6% (high care for an 
investment life of 20 years) to 9.0% (low care for 30 years). Table 9 summaries the estimates of the 
WACC by different reports with a range between 7.7% and 13.0%. Access Economics argued for a 
WACC of 9% (Access Economics 2009, p. 23). Deloitte Access Economics (2011a) estimated that for 
high care the IRR is 2.4% and the WACC is 9.8% (25 year investment), and for low care the IRR is 
8.4% and WACC is 8.6%. On these numbers they argue that there has been no incentive for 
investment in either type of bed. Only low care with a life of 30 years showed the IRR to be higher 
than the cost of capital. There were no scenarios where the investment in high care beds was 
positive and no scenarios calculated with an expected income generating life of a residential aged 
care facility of more than 30 years.  
Table 8 Estimates of the Internal Rate of Return by Deloitte et al 2011 
Report Estimate of IRR Comment 
(Deloitte Access Economics 
2011a) 
NB: From survey results they 
report that a 12% rate of return 
is demanded by investors 
High Care 
0.6% (20 years) 
2.4% (25 years) 
3.4% (30 years) 
Low care 
7.2% (20 years) 
8.4% (25 years) 
9.0% (30 years) 
Internal rate of return under 









Table 9 Past estimations of the WACC for RAC in Australia 
Report  Estimated WACC Comments 
Hogan 2004 10%  
(Access Economics 2009) 8.14% Recommends $43.65 a day for 
accommodation costs 
Grant Thornton (Ansell 2012)  
11.5% for high care tax payers 
13.0% for high care non tax 
10.94% for mixed tax payers 
12.20% for mixed non tax 
Cost of capital per bed day 
$88.23 high care tax payer 
$72.70 high care non-tax 
$84.73 mixed care tax payer 
$69.11 mixed non tax 




8.6% high care tax payers 
10.5% high care non-tax payers 
9.8% high care average 
8.2% mixed tax payers 
9.8% mixed non tax 
7.7% low care tax payers 
9.1% low care non tax 
8.6% low care average 
Nominal post tax WACC of the 
current system 
 
Recommends a daily high care 
charge of $64.62 or an 
accommodation bond of 
$238,240 for an investment to 
be viable. 




 Estimates of future a daily fee 
charge where 50% paid bonds  
$56.07 for non-metropolitan 
areas 
$69.99 for metropolitan areas 
 
The estimates of IRR and WACC use the daily accommodation payment (DAP) and equivalent lump 
sum payments in the form of a RAD. Access Economics (Access Economics 2009) argued in 2009 that 
the DAP needs to be around $43 a day to cover the capital and depreciation costs. Using a simple 
indexation based on CPI for the four years to 2013 of 9.7% (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
2013) this would equate to $47.2 a day in 2013. In a more recent report Deloitte Access Economics 
estimated that the DAP required to break even in the base case (50% of people using the bond 
option) was estimated to be $61.37. They concluded that ‘assuming all accommodation revenue was 
derived from periodic payments [DAPS], the breakeven periodic payment was estimated to be 
$64.42 [a day]. Assuming all accommodation revenue was derived from bonds the equivalent 
breakeven periodic payment was estimated to be $58.20’ (2011a, p. iii). The full range of these 
estimates is provided in Table 10.  
  





Table 10 Deloittes Access Economics 2011 Summary of daily accommodation charges based on a 25 year investment 
horizon  
Scenario and sensitivity No accommodation 
bonds 
50% accommodation 
bonds (base case) 
100% accommodation 
bonds 
Baseline $64.42 $61.37 $58.20 
Scenario    
Two-bed room $54.93 $52.17(a) $49.47 
Metropolitan $73.69 $69.99 $66.37 
Regional $59.04 $56.07 $53.16 
Sensitivity    
12% WACC — $76.60 — 
15% WACC — $94.35 — 
Cost of 
building$250,000 
$80.62 $76.57 $72.61 
Excluding the value of 
land(b) 
 $57.86  
Note: (a) In a one-bed room non-supported residents would pay $67.74 to cross-subsidise 20% supported residents, or 
$71.09 to cross-subsidise 40% supported residents. (b) This refers to excluding the cost of land in determining the cost of 
accommodation for the base case scenario only. Source: Deloitte Access Economics’ calculations. 
 
Deloitte Access Economics also calculated the accommodation bond sizes (or equivalent RAD and 
DAP combination) that would be required under the base case outline above. This they estimated at 
$361,689. They noted that  
 
‘the large increase in the bond amount compared to the required bond amount to break even under 
current policy (i.e. $238,240) is due to the removal of a provider’s capacity to retain part of the bond 
principal under the Productivity Commission recommendations. Consequently, more income must be 
earned from interest. Assuming all accommodation revenue was derived from accommodation bonds, 
the equivalent breakeven average bond was estimated to be $344,428. As this is higher than the 
average bond currently provided, future residents wishing to provide bonds may not be able to afford 
a bond of this size. This would reduce the stock of bonds. Larger bonds are required on average when 
fewer bonds are supplied to a provider because the benefit of reducing interest payments is shared 
between those providing a bond and those paying periodically.’ (Deloitte Access Economics 2011a, p. 
iv). 
 
Proposed accommodation payments 
The proposed model for accommodation payments for RAC recently announced will introduce, from 
1 July 2014, the following arrangements (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 
2013a): 
 greater transparency in the publication of accommodation costs to residents and 
prospective residents and other stakeholders; 
 residents will pay for accommodation costs through a refundable accommodation deposit 
(RAD) or a non-refundable daily accommodation payment (DAP); or a combination of both, 
and the arrangements will be formally agreed within 28 days of the resident entering the 
RAC; 
  





 accommodation payment will be one of three levels  
o Level 1 – up to the level of the maximum Government accommodation supplement 
($50 per day (2012 prices) and paid in part or full by the Government 
accommodation supplement for residents with ‘low means’) 
o Level 2 – Prices between Level 1 and an upper threshold of $85 per day (2012 prices) 
(which are set by providers following a self-assessment of the value of the 
accommodation on offer using the guidelines established by the Aged Care Pricing 
Commissioner) 
o Level 3 – Prices above the Level 2 threshold (for example, for a large modern private 
room with private ensuite and pre-approved by the Aged Care Pricing 
Commissioner). 
 In addition, following agreement with the resident, providers will be able to charge, on an 
‘op-in opt-out’ basis, an ‘additional amenity fee’ for amenities and services that are not 
included in basic services, the accommodation charge or ‘extra service’ charge; 
 the amount of the DAP will be derived from the RAD price using the ‘maximum permissible 
interest rate’ (MPIR) – which will be subject to review in 2017; 
 accommodation prices are to be set taking into consideration the privacy of the room, 
quality of the room and facility, and other factors including location, design and services 
(other than care services and services charged for through an extra service fee). 
 RADs will still be subject to a minimum permissible asset value test, prudential 
requirements, restrictions on use and regulations regarding refunds; 
 providers will not be allowed to deduct regular ‘retention amounts’ from the RAD but will be 
able to deduct amounts owing for ‘additional amenities’ or for periodic payments  or to top 
up the DAP (following agreement with the resident); and 
 providers will retain any interest earned on the RAD and this income may be used for any 
purpose approved under the prudential compliance safeguards.  
  




Assessment of future sustainability 
The key question is whether these arrangements will create a level of return on investment 
sufficient to create a sustainable system. From the two reports by KPMG for the Aged Care Financing 
Authority (KPMG 2013a, 2013b) and the Inaugural Report of the Authority (Aged Care Financing 
Authority 2013) the following conclusion were drawn: 
 Increased price transparency (publication of accommodation prices) and consumer choice of 
payment method with up to 28 days' grace after entry 'may mean that some people pay a 
DAP when they would have otherwise paid a RAD.'  
o This 'may reduce the value of new RADs from low care and extra service residents by 
$402.8 million in 2014-15' (KPMG 2013a, p. 11). 
o However, RADs for High Care will provide HC providers with 'the opportunity to 
increase their lump sum accommodation payments by $3.4 billion', resulting in 
'increased income and avoided cost of debt from new RADs and DAPs from high care 
residents' of $93.5 million in 2014-15 (KPMG 2013a, p. 11) with further income 
benefits thereafter (p. 12). 
 Low care providers, small providers, RRR providers, and providers with a 
high proportion of supported residents will not significantly benefit from 
these changes (p. 12). 
 KPMG estimate that one-third of potential RADs will shift to DAPs in 2014-15 
(p. 46), but this will largely depend on whether the unsold family home can 
generate rental income sufficient to cover the DAP (p. 47). 
o Removal of retentions may reduce income from low care and extra service residents 
by $68.4 million in 2014-15. However, providers are permitted to increase the price 
of accommodation (RADs and DAPs) to compensate for this loss of income from 
reduced RAD balances, including for 'increased cost of debt' (p.11). 
 The estimated increase in incomes from high care entrants is more than enough to offset 
predicted losses from transfers from RADs to DAPs in low and extra service residents (KPMG 
2013b, p. 47). High care providers 'will be able to increase their income and reduce the cost 
of debt' (p. 48) and the reforms will also 'provide greater access to lump sum payments' 
across the whole service system (p.47). They estimated that there will be a significant 
increase in persons paying accommodation charges above the maximum government 
accommodation subsidy of $52.84 from virtually no one to about 36% (p. 48). 
 Level 2 pricing threshold for accommodation payments may hold down accommodation 
prices when the ACPC does not grant permission for a price above that threshold to be 
applied based on the 'value of the room'.  
 Net increase in value of new RADs from 2014-15 will support greater investment activity, but 
this will differ according to individual provider circumstances (p.13) 




 Overall investment in new residential aged care building stock (which was in significant 
decline from 2009), has started to increase with new building work in progress increasing by 
11.6%, upgrading work increasing by 60.3% between 2010-11 and 2011-12, and rebuilding 
work increasing by 18% since 2009-10 (p.16). In the 12 months to April 2013 total value of 
aged care building work was $1.2 billion compared to $823 million in the previous year (an 
increase of 45%) (p.16). 
KPMG averaged investment in new facilities and rebuilding for the five years 2007-8 to 2011-12 
inclusive, and obtained an average figure of $997 million/annum. Were that level of investment to 
be retained each year for the decade 2012-13 to 2021-22, there would be 'a projected investment 
gap of $15.0 billion across the decade equating to around 80,000 places (p.16).  
'If investment in residential care does not change, the demand for residential care has the potential 
to outstrip supply in the near future' (p.73)10. Overall, the ACFA predicts positive investment into the 
industry in general, driven by strong demand for care places and increased funding directed to the 
industry through the LLLB reforms but different segments will be differently attractive to investors 
(Aged Care Financing Authority 2013, p. 67). 
However, there may be concerns with these positive estimates of the impact of the proposed 
changes. The estimates by KPMG are based on a number of assumptions about consumer 
preferences, including that aged consumers make predictable and economically rational choices 
concerning the maximisation of their wealth, and on the level of RADs that the current stock of high 
care facilities will be able to attract. Some of those assumptions may need to be subject to further 
testing and public scrutiny to generate confidence that their assessment of the outcome of the 
proposed reforms is sufficiently robust. There may be a case a delay in their implementation to 
enable further testing of the proposed changes to occur.  
Issues arising from the assessment of sustainability 
The following issues arise from this discussion of accommodation payments and of the level of 
sustainability of the sector. 
Issue 9 - impact on small and RRR providers of the three tier bands of accommodation charges 
Will the proposed bands of accommodation payments create a three tier (or two tier) system, 
with varying degrees of financial viability and quality, that may make it difficult to attract 
providers to rural and remote locations?  Will there also be a problem for older facilities that they 
will have to charge lower rates due to sub-optimal facilities and therefore enter a downward 
income spiral that will not support 'substantial refurbishments' and new facilities? 
  
                                                          
10 However this investment average is calculated across the GFC years and the 'waiting for reform' 
years when, arguably, providers were deliberately withholding investment to see where the reforms 
were going. KPMG (2013a, p. 74) noted that there was a severe downturn in completed building 
work in 2010-12 which may have created a lower than expected five year average. 
 




Issue 10 – Impact of the proposed accommodation charges 
The proposed accommodation payments to be introduced in 2014, may have the result that those 
sections of the industry that are able to levy an accommodation charge at Level 2 or Level 3 will 
generate an income sufficient to be sustainable. It is also possible that those beds that levy an 
accommodation charge at Level 1 for places in two-bed rooms will generate an income above the 
estimated break-even price (Table 10). These changes are likely to have a significant and lasting 
impact on the sector and should be introduced carefully. Is there a consistent view among 
providers that while the proposed accommodation payments may enable providers to operate 
viable services that meet consumer preferences and create a financially sustainable sector the 
significance of the change is such that it should only be introduced after future analysis is 
completed on the full impact of the change? 
Issue 11 – expected income generating life of a residential aged care facility 
The estimates of the WACC appear to be very sensitive to the expected useful life of a RAC facility 
(see Table 8 above). Is it reasonable to expect that facilities 30 years old will no longer be able to 
generate an income and what is a reasonable expected income generating life for the purpose of 
estimating WACC and other financial performance indicators? 
Issue 12 – balancing quality and financial performance 
The available data on performance and sustainably of the sector appears to be based entirely on an 
assessment of financial metrics. There is no attempt in any of the reports reviewed to balance 
financial performance, financial viability or system sustainability with quality of care and outcomes 
for residents, or with community expectations or objectives. These financial estimates appear to 
make the assumption, but it is not explicitly stated, that all operating RAC service are of equal and 
acceptable quality. There appears to be a significant gap in our knowledge of the relationship 
between financial performance and of quality and between staffing levels and quality.  For example, 
it is sometimes suggested that not for profit entities enjoy greater staffing ratios than for-profit 
entities and that this does contribute to higher quality.  How do we strike a sensible balance 
between the measures of financial performance with the measures of quality so that we can judge 
the cost of quality and variation in quality between provider types? 
 
  




Summary of financial viability and sustainability 
Reports of EBITDA across the industry over the past decades suggest wide variation in performance. 
Assessments for the same year by different analysts also report significant differences, presumably 
because of different samples and methods of calculation. The most recent, and arguably the most 
comprehensive assessment as it is based on data from all providers, is the data from KPMG based on 
GPFR data. These data suggest that the viability of providers, based on assessment of EBITDA, is 
improving but that there are concerns with some segments of the industry as 16% of providers 
reported a negative EBIDTA11. A similar picture emerges of a variation in estimations of return on 
investment, return on assets and return on equity across different analyst reports and an apparent 
lack of consensus on what level of returns will constitute a viable service in the long term and a 
sustainable industry.  
The assessment by KPMG of the changes to be introduced in 2014 to accommodation deposits and 
daily charges, which has been accepted by the ACFA, reports confidence that these reforms will 
generate increased income to the industry. However there is still a degree of uncertainty in the mix 
of payment methods consumers will choose between RADs and DAPs and a mixture of both and the 
impacts that this will have on some providers, particularly small and rural and regions providers. 
Administrative and allocative efficiency 
Administrative efficiency 
The PC argued that the (then) current system did not achieve administrative efficiency due to 
features which were duplicative, excessive and unnecessary and which resulted in high compliance 
costs. The PC report particularly highlighted concerns about the accreditation and quality assurance 
systems particularly the continual reliance on paper systems for evidence to satisfy accreditation. 
These quality systems identified good process but not good outcomes, and the regulatory initiatives 
associated with compliance procedures (police checks, etc.,) were identified as having imposed 
significant and avoidable regulatory burdens (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 101). As the 
Commission argued, many compliance tasks 'relate to quantity and price restrictions and over-
reaction to specific incidents' (Productivity Commission 2011: p. XLVI) and 'distort the nature of the 
services provided in ways that do not benefit the clients' (PC 2011 p.127).  
The Productivity Commission's Annual Review of Regulatory Burdens on Business: Social and 
Economic Infrastructure Services (2009) found that:  
The regulatory framework is complex and fragmented due to the existence of several programs 
regulated by numerous government departments across three tiers of government resulting in an 
unnecessary cost imposition on providers. ... [S]ome existing regulations have shown little concern for 
minimising compliance costs to providers ... . The extensive increase in regulation in recent years does 
not reflect the high standards of care [provided] by the vast majority of providers (p. 19). 
  
                                                          
11
 One limitation of these reports is that the assessment of EBIDTA is based on provider data not on services 
data which is the basis of the benchmark reports of the other analysts. This has the effect of reduced analysis 
of performance by location and service, where large providers operate geographically diverse services across 
both high and low care yet report as one entity. 




It argued that 'unnecessary complexity gives rise to avoidable costs for providers and consumers 
alike’ (2009, p. 23) and excessive regulation and the rationing of aged care places prevents providers 
achieving efficiencies in 'scale and scope' (25 2009); together these two forces create administrative 
inefficiencies. However, the report provided no estimate of the cost of the regulatory burden. The 
Commission argued that promoting more competition in any locality would promote better practice 
(and innovation) and displace less efficient (and less compliant) services, lessening the reliance on 
regulation to ensure high quality services (2009, p. 25), however it did not produce data to support 
this assertion. 
Overall, there appears to be little concrete data on the cost of the existing compliance system. 
When, as part of the aged care reform package Regulatory Impact Statement (DoHA 2012), the aged 
care sector was invited to provide details of estimated costs of compliance to assist the government 
to accurately gauge the cost of the new measure, no data-supported responses were provided. 
Deloitte Access Economics (2011a, p. 46) state that compliance costs are one factor in relatively high 
WACC's in aged care but they do not offer any estimate of the cost impact of over-regulation. They 
also argue that the move towards CDC across aged care will increase the burden of reporting and 
compliance (p. 60), however they are of the view that this will be countered by the efficiencies to be 
gained from more competition across the sector (p.58). 
In summary all parties appear to agree that the impact of compliance costs on the financial 
performance and financial viability of the sector is significant but there is no agreement on the 
amount. Clearly, the impact of the regulatory burden on viability requires further investigation, if 
only because it has an impact of perceptions of industry cost regimes and viability, and therefore on 
investment. 
Access and allocative efficiency 
One indicator of allocative efficiency of the residential aged care system used by the Productivity 
Commission is length of time taken to access care for persons who have been assessed as in need of 
residential aged care by an aged care assessment team (ACAT). Data on elapsed time are illustrated 
in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below ((SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service 
Provision) 2012, p. 13.55). These figures may be one measure of sustainability in the system as they 
can indicate the comparative tightness of supply. The PC in 2012 concluded that  
‘Overall, 23.0 per cent of all people entering residential high care during 2010-11 did so within 7 days 
of being approved by an ACAT compared with 25.2 per cent in 2009-10. In 2010-11, 51.0 per cent 
entered within one month of their ACAT approval and 74.0 per cent entered within 3 months of their 
approval (figure 13.23), compared with 53.7 per cent and 77.2 per cent respectively in 2009-10 (table 
13A.67). The median time for entry into high care residential services was 28 days in 2010-11 
compared with 26 days in 2009-10 '(SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government 
Service Provision) 2012, p. 13.55  Table 13A.67). 
However, in their Inaugural Report, the ACFA used only median days of waiting between an ACAT 
assessment and entry into residential care and reported that ‘it remains relatively unchanged in high 
care and is decreasing in low care’ (2013, p. 52). This appears to be a less granular interpretation of 
the data than Figure 1 and Figure 2 below suggest. The trend in these data shows a slight 
deterioration in the time to access care as the percentage of people accessing care within 7 days, 
one month and three months has declined – that is a smaller percentage of assessed persons 




entered residential aged care within three months. There were also a higher percentage of persons 
accessing residential care after nine months for both high care and low care.  
Figure 1 Elapsed time between ACAT approval and entry into residential care for high care residents 2005-06 –to 2010-
11 
 
Figure 2 Elapsed time between ACAT approval and entry into residential care for low care residents 2005-06 –to 2010-11 
 
While there may be multiple explanations for this delay in admission to residential care, including 
the growth in community care places over the same period, one explanation may be a restriction in 
supply of available beds within the RAC sector. Restriction of supply would be expected to increase 
occupancy; however, this is not reflected in average bed occupancy. Across Australia bed occupancy 
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In addition, what these aggregate figures do not indicate is local, regional or jurisdictional variation. 
As the majority of services are located in major cities or inner regional locations the performance of 
these services will dominate these statistics. What is needed is a more granular set of indicators to 
illustrate differences in performance by location and type of provider. 
Another indicator of access to care used by the Productivity Commission is the waiting time for 
hospital patients classified as ‘aged care type’ whose length of stay was greater than 35 days. In 
contrast to the data above, the proportion of all patients classified as maintenance and whose 
length of stay is more than 35 days has declined over the period 2005 to 2010 (SCRGSP (Steering 
Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) 2012). This suggests that access to RAC 
for person in acute hospitals has improved over the five years to 2010.  
Figure 3 Public hospital separations for care type "maintenance" for people aged 70 years and over and Indigenous 
people aged 50-69 2005-06 to 2009-10 
 
There is variability between jurisdictions across Australia in the proportion of separations for ‘aged 
care type’ patients (those with a length of stay of over 35 days in hospitals) and in the number of 
bed days used by patients waiting for transfer to a RAC facility. While Victoria had a higher 
proportion of ‘aged care type patients’ discharged from hospital the number of days spent in 
hospital was low in comparison with other states. Conversely, while the proportion of persons in 
South Australia classified as ‘aged care type’ patients was close to the national average, the number 
of bed days spent in hospital by patients waiting for transfer to a RAC facility was much higher than 
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Figure 4 Proportion of separations for ‘aged care type’ public hospitals patients that were 35 days or longer 
 
Source (SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) 2012 Figure 13.26) 
Figure 5 Hospital patient days used by patients waiting for residential aged care 
 
Source: (SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) 2012 Figure 13.27) 
System sustainability requires each of the different components of the system of care for the aged 
to be efficient and effective in working together. There appears to be differences across the states 
and territories in access to residential aged care. 
  




Issues related to administrative and allocative efficiency 
The following issue are suggested from this discussion of administrative and allocative efficiency.  
Issue 13 – the cost benefit of regulatory compliance 
Based on our current knowledge neither the benefits to residents and clients, nor the financial cost 
of regulatory compliance is currently known with any certainty. Consequently the impact on 
efficiency and the viability of the sector is unclear. What is the real benefits to consumers, what is 
the real cost to providers, consumers, and what is the cost benefit to the community of the 
current regulatory and compliance burden on the industry? 
Issue 14 – measuring access to care 
In a system of care that relies heavily on funding from taxation there is a reasonable expectation 
that indicators of access and allocative efficiency will be agreed and measured. Is there consensus 
on what is an appropriate wait for access to care and does it serve as a benchmark for the 
allocative efficiency of the residential aged care system? 
Issue 15 – measure of regional access to care 
Current indicators of access to care do not report performance at the regional level. Should we have 
publicly reported and agreed measures of access to care on a jurisdictional and regional basis as 
an indication of local allocation efficiency, and access to care by different categories of providers, 
rather than rely on aggregated national and jurisdictional analysis? 
 
  




Home and community aged care services 
Structural changes to home care services  
Major structural changes for community and home care services for the aged are being 
implemented as part of the LLLB suite of reforms which may have a significant bearing on future 
operational income and expenditure.  
These reforms include the following: 
 the introduction of new tiers of services to the community care services provided under the 
Aged Care Act 1997 (CACP, EACH, EACHD etc.,) which are now called the Home Care 
Packages Program 
 a new Commonwealth Home Support Program to commence from 1 July 2015 which will 
incorporate the existing Commonwealth HACC Program, the National Respite for Carers 
Program (NRCP), the Day Therapy Centres (DTC) Program, and the Assistance with Care and 
Housing for the Aged (ACHA) Program 
 new levels of interface between the Home Support Program and the Home Care Packages 
Program; although these are yet to be announced, general guidelines are currently available 
(Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2013c) 
 the introduction of consumer directed care (CDC) policies and procedures progressively over 
the two years to 2015. 
The following changes to home care provided under the Aged Care Act 1997 (as amended) came into 
effect on 1 July 2013: 
 there will be four new levels of home care  
1. Basic care package 
2. Low level care package 
3. Intermediate care package 
4. High level care package 
 there are five possible supplements 
o an additional 10 percent dementia or veterans supplement for the additional costs 
associated with eligible care recipients with dementia 
o oxygen supplement 
o homeless supplement 
o enteral feeding supplement 
o viability supplement 
 there will be an aged care workforce supplement (subject to conditions yet to be announced 
by the Australian Government)  
 from 1 July 2014 a consumer fee will be charged and the government subsidy for that care 
recipient will be reduced according to the ‘income tested fee payable’ (Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing 2013c, p. 55) 
 care recipients will need to be assessed by an Aged Care Assessment Team (ACAT) and 
approved as eligible for RAC but who choose to, and are able to, stay at home  




 all new packages must be delivered on a Consumer Directed Care (CDC) basis12 (Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing 2013c)  
o the approved provider is the fund holder for packages delivered on a CDC basis and 
administers the funds (taking account of the list of excluded services and items) on 
behalf of the care recipient and all CDC packages must have an individualised budget 
(specifying administrative costs, core advisory and case management services, and 
service and support provision and/or purchasing) 
o the consumer must be provided with a copy of the budget and monthly statements  
o unspent funds can be retained by the provider under defined circumstances 
o consumers can agree with the provider to ‘top up’ their packages by purchasing 
additional services 
 providers will be allocated a specific number of home care places which will attract 
subsidies. 
Viability of current community care services 
In recent years there has been less focus by reviewers on the financial viability of the community 
aged care sector than on the viability of the residential aged care sector in Australia and 
consequently there is less data on which to base an assessment of the sustainability of the 
community aged care sector. The major difference between the sectors, which may explain the 
lower level of interest in financial viability of community care, is the absence of major (or any) 
capital cost involved in establishing new community care services as virtually all costs (building 
equipment and motor vehicles) can be leased and accounted for as operational costs. The question 
of viability and long-term sector sustainability therefore relate almost exclusively to the question of 
operational costs and most particularly care staff costs. 
A summary of the Stewart Brown report on their survey of providers of CACPs, EACH and EACHD 
services for the December quarter 2012 is provided in  
Table 11. This survey consisted of responses from 363 community care providers which collectively 
operated 11,215 community aged care places. They reported that the average EBITDA per annum for 
each package CACP package was $962 or 5.2% of income, for EACH, $18.80 or 14.2% of income, and 
for EACHD $24.97 or 17.7% of income. These EBITDA, in dollars, for EACH and EACHD compare 
favourably with the EBITDA for residential care despite the absence of investment in capital and on a 
percentage basis suggest a higher rate of return on income than residential care (about 3.8% for 
residential care).  
Table 11 Stewart Brown survey of providers of CACP – selected results December 2012 
 Six months to 
December 2012 
Top Quartile 
performers six months 
to December 2012 
Twelve months to 
June 2012 
                                                          
12 CDC will involve the care recipient (or carer/guardian) identifying the goals they seek from care, signing 
a Home Care Agreement and agreeing a care plan, and some level of involvement with managing of their 
care; and care may involve ‘innovative ways to meet the consumer’s goals and care needs’ within the 
overall value of the package (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2013c, p. 27). 
 




 Six months to 
December 2012 
Top Quartile 
performers six months 
to December 2012 
Twelve months to 
June 2012 
CACP 
Net operating results $2.24 $8.39 $2.14 
Results as a % of 
income 
5.2% 19.4% 5.09% 
EBITDA per annum per 
package 
$962 $3,189 $960 
EACH 
Net operating results $18.80 $42.09 $19.52 
Results as a % of 
income 
14.2% 31.6% 14.9% 
EBITDA per annum per 
package 
$7,102 $15,580 $7,450 
EACHD 
Net operating results $24.97 $46.45 $23.15 
Results as a % of 
income 
17.7% 31.9% 16.44% 
EBITDA per annum per 
package 
$9,316 $17,065 $8,763 
 
While the result, for the average provider of CACPs, was favourable ($2.24) for the December 2012 
quarter, Stewart Brown (2013) reports that the average results per day in the June 2006 quarter 
were almost $4.00 a day. They report that while there are fluctuations from one quarter to another 
there is a general downward trend in operational performance over the past six years for CACPs. 
Conversely, this report indicates that the financial performance, on average for EACH and EACHD has 
shown an increase in the six years to 2012; EACH from about $11.00 per client day to nearly $20.00 
per client day, and EACHD from approximately $17.00 a day to nearly $25.00 a day.  
Of course it is important to consider these programs in context both in terms of the size of the 
programs and the size of the services. At 30 June 2012 there were 46,588 CACPs, 8,520 EACH and 
4,192 EACHD operational places across Australia compared with 184,570 operational residential 
places (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2012b). Community care packages 
are provided by approximately 2,040 services13 across Australia (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare 2012). According to the AIHW (2012) most of the services offering EACH and EACHD 
packages (78% and 83% respectively) provided between 1 and 20 packages, while of those providing 
CACP, 43% provided 1–20 packages, 27% 21–40 packages, 13% 41–60 packages, and 4% more than 
120 packages. The picture emerges of a sector dominated by providers of small community aged 
care services where their viability, were they to be provided on a stand-alone basis, would be an 
important issue. However, while there may be a small number of providers which provide only one 
type of community aged care service, or provide only community aged care services, the majority of 
community aged care providers provide more than one type of service; that is, more than one 
community service (HACC and community aged care) or, as is the case with the majority of 
                                                          
13
 The Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing counts a separate service where a provider 
receives funding for a category of aged care. Consequently one provider may receive funding for more than 
one service.   




community aged care providers, provide residential aged care and community aged care services 
(Baldwin 2013). This raises the question of the financial viability of these services were they to stand 
alone and the extent to which there is cross subsidisation of different services provided by the same 
operator.  
Impact of the Aged Care Workforce Supplement 
In the December quarter of 2012 Stewart Brown report that expenditure on salaries and wages of 
care staff in community aged care services is 68% of all costs for CACP 63% for EACH and 62% for 
EACHD. Some submissions to the PC enquiry argued that the increase in staffing costs were not 
matched by indexation to the subsidies (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 126). Details of the 
changes to the Workforce Supplement package introduced by the previous Australian Government 
have been foreshadowed by the current Government but the details of these are not available at the 
time this paper was prepared and consequently their impact is uncertain.  
Impact of CDC on the viability of community aged care providers 
The (draft) guidelines for the operation of CDC packages limit the use of the funds by consumers and 
community aged care providers (Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing 2013c) 
and place certain obligations on service providers. 
In summary, the consumer is limited to choosing services that are within the scope of the Home Care 
Packages Program and providers can refuse to purchase services that: 
 have not been shown to be effective, are ineffective or potentially harmful, where there 
have been previous difficulties or negative experiences or will result in a consumer going 
without necessary clinical services  
 may cause the provider to fail to comply with its legal responsibilities  
 are outside the provider’s preferred list of service providers and it is not possible to agree a 
contract or the cost of the service/item is beyond the scope of the available funds. 
There are a number of obligations places on community aged care providers in relation to CDC. 
These include the following: 
 All CDC packages must have an individualised budget identifying 
o the full amount of the government subsidy for the package level; 
o all funding from relevant government supplements14, eg Dementia, Veterans’, 
Oxygen and Enteral Feeding Supplements (where applicable); and 
o any consumer contribution/fee 
o any small “contingency” 
 The expenditure plan in the budget should include: 
 administrative costs; 
 core advisory and care management services; and 
 service and support provision and/or purchasing 
 the consumer must be provided with a monthly statement of income and expenditure in a 
format that is consistent with the individualised budget, that enables the consumer to 
understand and which shows where funds have been expended and the balance of funds 
                                                          
14
 Funding paid to the approved provider through the Aged Care Workforce and Viability Supplements (if 
applicable) does not have to be included in the individualised budget. 




 the provider should arrange for the individualised budget, plan and regular statements to be 
made available to the consumer in a language other than English if necessary 
 unspent funds 
o stay with a consumer moving to a new package with the same providers 
o can be retained if the consumer moves to a different approved provider  
o can be retained where the consumer is deceased  
o should be used to support service delivery for other consumers, or for infrastructure 
purposes. 
These new policy and procedural arrangements for CDC also appear to reduce the flexibility 
previously available to community aged care providers to accumulate the subsidies for all 
community aged care clients into a single account from which assessed care is paid; that is, using 
pooled income to enable cross subsidisation between clients generating the same income but where 
some (at a point in time) have fewer needs and others have more needs. There also could be 
significant limitations placed on the use of accumulated income from community care for cross 
subsidisation of other services – eg one type of community care service to another, between 
community and residential care, between services operated by the same provider but in different 
locations etc..   
A number of issues related to cost and viability have been reported in the international literature 
and that may arise with the introduction of CDC 
 increased administrative costs due to the increased need for budgeting, reporting, invoicing, 
upgrading IT systems and transacting brokered services thereby placing a large burden on small 
providers  
 care recipients were more likely to use direct payments to request additional services (such as 
cleaning, short notice care, gardening etc., ) which may allow providers to expand the type of 
services they offer 
 providers face greater competition from self-employed carers but did not face a high level of 
competition from other providers (Baxter et al. 2008; Stevens et al. 2011; Wilberforce et al. 
2011).  
Additional issues have been identified by Deloitte Access Economics (2011a, p. 59) 
 assistance required by those consumers and carers who face difficulties in managing a care 
budget 
 administrative time associated with those consumers or carers who may wish to choose 
inappropriate care and care with little or poor health outcomes 
 there may be excessive pricing of CDC services in a region that has little competition and barriers 
to entry, for example in rural or remote areas.  
  




Issues related to home and community aged care services 
The following issues arise from the discussion of the viability and sustainability of the home and 
community aged care services and the potential impact of the current reforms.  
Issue 16 – cross subsidisation of community and home care services 
The complex mix of community and home care services suggests that many have a high level of 
support from governing bodies and related services. Should we require community aged care 
services to be financially viable as stand-alone services or is it a reasonable expectation that they 
will always require cross subsidisation by the provider from resources (buildings, equipment, 
management and systems) and assets that are funded by other services (residential aged care, 
HACC etc.)  
Issue 17 – impact of CDC financial viability of home and community care services 
There is the potential that the implementation of CDC will change the level of cross subsidisation 
within services and between services because of the requirement to quarantine funding to individual 
clients. There appear to also be an increased administrative cost generated by the creation of 
individual budgets and regular individual financial reports.  
What level of cross subsidisation is acceptable or desirable from both a financial viability and a 
community viability viewpoint – will cross subsidisation be possible with CDC? 
What is the impact of CDC on the financial viability of community aged care services through the 
increased administrative and transaction costs and through the limits on cross subsidisation?  
 
  




Goals and objectives of a viable and sustainable aged care system 
Goals of the aged care program 
These goals of the Australian Government in establishing the Aged Care Program are contained in 
the Aged Care Act and are, inter alia;  
 to promote high quality care and accommodation,  
 to protect the health and well-being of recipients of care,  
 to target those most in need,  
 to facilitate access to care, to meet the needs of recipients of care, to facilitate 
independence and choice, and  
 to have due regard to limited resources (Aged Care Act 1997, p. 3).  
Two years after introducing the Act the Australian Government commissioned a review and specified 
that the review examine the goals of the Act, naming them as;  
 access and equity of access to groups and in different locations;  
 affordability;  
 quality, having regard to (inter alia) user rights;  
 efficiency; and  
 industry viability (Gray 2001).  
In his review of pricing arrangements in RAC in Australia, Hogan (2004, p. 9) argues that the 
Australian government follows four goals in relation to RAC namely: 
 quality,  
 equity,  
 efficiency and  
 sustainability.  
The Productivity Commission (2011), as part of its review of aged care policy in Australia, argued that 
government subsidies should;  
 promote independence and wellness among the aged;  
 ensure access to services for those who need them;  
 provide consumers with choice and control;  
 treat consumers with dignity and respect;  
 be affordable for individuals and society and;  
 provide incentives to ensure the efficient use of resources (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 
71).  
These attributes were supported by a number of submissions from stakeholders to the Commission 
(Productivity Commission 2011, p. 73). 
It is interesting to note that only Gray and Hogan specifically mention viability and sustainability as 
specific goals of the system, although it could be argued that only viable operations in a sustainable 




industry can achieve the other goals. Consequently it is worth developing a specific set of goals that 
could be pursued by the industry in seeking to achieve business viability and sector sustainability.  
Possible goals for viability and sustainability in the aged care sector 
Possible goals to achieve a sustainable sector will need to retain notions of efficiency, equity of 
access and quality as these concepts underpin the Australian aged care system and retain strong 
community support. Consequently, government financing and funding policy should aim to achieve 
the following goals in relation to aged care: 
 an efficient sector which achieves; 
o allocative efficiency where there are no major distortions to the distribution of 
services (that is, where some groups enjoy potential oversupply while others have a 
deficiency of services, e.g., between rich and poor communities, between major cities 
and smaller communities, majority and special needs groups, etc.) and where there 
is reasonable choice between different individual operators and organisational 
types 
o technical efficiency by maximising outputs and outcomes in relation to inputs 
o administrative efficiency by the minimising of costs and barriers to operations 
through excessive regulation 
o the adoption of quality care practices and appropriate technology that will lead to 
better care and efficiency 
 a socially viable sector where  
o the mix and quality of service is acceptable to the community  
o the balance between quality and cost, and between government funding and 
consumer co-payment is acceptable to the community 
o there is an integrated and stable mix of acute, community and residential care 
 a sustainable sector achieved through a funding and financing model that 
o allows service providers to generate sufficient surpluses and profits to maintain 
their viability and continuing operations  
o encourages continuous investment for long term sector sustainability. 
  




Assessment of the current systems against these goals 
The following table assesses the current system against these goals based on the material provided 
in the section above on the current issues. In the column headed ‘current performance’ cells 
couloured ‘amber’ suggest this is partially achieved, ‘red’ not achieved and ‘green’ achieved under 
the current system.  




No major distortions to the distribution 
of services and where there is 
reasonable choice 
 Variations in the financial performance of 
services based on service location and sizes 
threatens achievement of this goal 
Reasonable choice between different 
individual operators and organisational 
types 
 Choice between operators and organisational 
types may be limited in rural and remote 
locations 
Technical efficiency by maximising 
outputs and outcomes in relation to 
inputs 
 Past studies have suggested there is the 
capacity for efficiency improvements to 
increase viability and sustainability 
Administrative efficiency by the 
minimising of costs and barriers to 
operations through excessive regulation 
 There is some evidence that excessive 
regulation is a burden on the financial 
performance of current operators 
The adoption of quality care practices 
and appropriate technology that will 
lead to better care and efficiency 
 There may be a relationship between 
financial viability and investment in 
appropriate technology.  
The mix and quality of service is 
acceptable to the community  
 
 The mix of services is currently regulated by 
government planning and community 
acceptance is poorly measured 
The balance between quality and cost, 
and between government and consumer 
payment is acceptable to the community 
 There is a need to closely evaluate the impact 
on consumers of the future charges for 
accommodation in residential care and co-
payments for community care 
An integrated and stable mix of acute, 
community and residential care. 
 
 There is some evidence of a deterioration in 
the interface between acute care services 
and residential care measured by time to 
access care [and management stays in 
hospital beyond 35 days] 
There is evidence of great inefficiencies in the 
management of the interface between acute 
care and residential/ community care 
Allows service providers to generate 
sufficient surpluses and profits to 
maintain their viability 
 There are conflicting reports on the viability 
of current operation; some providers appear 
to be producing large surpluses and other do 
not appear to be viable in the short time.  
There may need to be investment in better 
leadership and management to achieve gains 
here. 
Encourage continuous investment for 
long term sector sustainability 
 
 Depending on the consumer preference for 
the DAP and the RAD the changes to the 
funding for accommodation may achieve long 
term sustainability for some sections of the 
industry only. 
  




What options are available to achieve a viable and sustainable 
system? 
 
The following options are suggested to address the issues raised in this report. 
Option 1: Establish acceptable benchmarks to measure viability and sustainability 
There are varying assessments of performance of viability and sustainability used by government 
and non-government analysts and stakeholders. In the absence of agreed benchmarks on what is 
acceptable minimum performance, different conclusions can be arrived at by different analysts from 
assessment of the same data. While it is unrealistic to anticipate that all stakeholders will agree on 
the same acceptable level of performance, an improvement to the current system may emerge from 
a consensus within the industry on the range of measures that most clearly indicate performance.  
For example, the dominant current financial metric used by most stakeholders is EBITDA rather than 
a metric such as NPBT.  EBITDA does not include the depreciation of new facilities as they get old.  As 
the sector consolidates and moves to a model based on creating and refurbishing facilities to cater 
for consumer demand rather than government grant availability, it will be increasingly important to 
properly account for the cost of replacing new for old.     
This option would involve an exercise to gain consensus on the range of indicators and the levels of 
those indicator that would measure minimum desirable or minimum acceptable performance of 
financial viability and sustainability. The agreed indicators may result in an increase in the supply of 
data by providers and this may add to their regulatory burden and costs. There would need to be 
separate indicators for the residential aged care sector and the home and community aged care 
sector. For some indicators it may be agreed that different minimum desirable or acceptable levels 
could apply depending on some factors such as location or organisational type.  
Issues addressed by this option: Issue 1, Issue 2, Issue 3, Issue 10, Issue 11 
Option 2: Create a publicly available, de-identified, universal, national data set to enable 
assessments of quality and financial performance 
Reports on financial viability and sector sustainability in recent years have not only used different 
indicators and methods of assessing them but they have also based their calculations on different 
data bases. What is needed is a single national database that collects a range of data on resources, 
financial performance, quality indicators from all publicly funded residential, home and community 
aged care services and, in turn, makes the data publicly available.  
Issues addressed by this Option: Issue 4, Issue 5, Issue 6, Issue 7, Issue 8, Issue 10, Issue 12, Issue 
13, Issue 14, Issue 15, Issue 16 
  




Option 3: Encourage early assessment of the impacts of the LLLB reforms 
The ACFA and others have suggested a number of actions to monitor and analyse the impacts of the 
LLLB reforms. These actions should include the following: 
• assess the impact of the reforms on the viability of different classes of providers and across 
the sector 
• monitor the mix levels and values of DAPs, the value of RADs, the shifts between the RADs 
and DAPs and the range of arrangement made where a combination of payments between 
RADs and DAPs are agreed to determine the impact that these arrangements have on the 
viability of services and the sustainability of the sector 
• monitoring the impact of the accommodation charges on RRR services and the adequacy of 
the viability supplement to enable these services to remain viable 
• monitoring the impact of the introduction of CDC on the capacity of service to cross 
subsidise across clients, locations, programs and services 
• monitor the impact on quality of service of the ‘opt in/opt out’ services to be offered to 
residents 
• assessing the impact of price signals on demand for both residential and home and 
community aged care and the impact of changes to accommodation payments on access to 
care 
• monitoring the impact of the reforms on the workforce 
Issues addressed by this Option: Issue 1, Issue 6, Issue 8, Issue 9, Issue 10, Issue 13, Issue 14, Issue 
16, Issue 17 
 
Option 4: Determine the reasons for the variability in financial performance across 
similar and non- similar providers. 
A consistent finding from varying reports over time has been the variability in financial performance 
as measured by EBITDA(R), profitability, return on investments as well as other indicators. 
Considering the relative consistency across providers and services of the nature of the residents, the 
controls on pricing and subsidies, and the cost of labour, the large variability is unexpected and 
unexplained. While there is some indication that provider type, size and location may have some 
influence on performance these factors fail to explain all variations. What is needed is an assessment 
as to whether the large variability in performance is associated with quality of care, pricing and 
income, management performance or some external factors. Most importantly, there is a need to 
investigate if the variables that contribute to the performance of the top quartile operators can be 
adopted by the lowest performing quartile. 
Issues addressed with this Option: Issue 4, Issue 5, Issue 6, Issue 8, issue 13,  




Option 5: Improve efficiency in operations 
There are a number of areas where greater efficiency may be achieved through the adoption of 
improved business processes and structural changes. These areas include  
• greater use of information technology across a range of care and business processes in aged 
care services 
• better interface with the primary and acute care sectors including relations with Medicare 
Locals, hospitals transfers and the use of nurse practitioners 
• encouragement of vertical integration between home and community aged care providers 
and residential aged care providers especially of small stand-alone services 
• providing incentives for better investment in leadership at all levels within the sector with a 
particular focus on middle and senior management and clinical leadership.  
Issues addressed with this option: Issue 5, Issue 6, Issue 8, Issue 13, Issue 16, Issue 17 
 
Option 6: Investigate mechanisms to improve and sustain the viability of services in outer 
regional, remote and very remote services 
A number of the recent reforms announced as part of the LLLB may not be as beneficial to services 
in RRR as they are to metropolitan and inner regional services. The lower net wealth of non-
metropolitan residents limits the amount that providers can charge for both RADs and DAPs. Smaller 
communities also mean that some RRR services will carry unoccupied beds for longer and have 
higher difficulty in recruiting staff than services in more populated areas. Options that could be 
investigated to improve the viability of small RRR services include:  
• an assessment of the actual costs of providing care in RRR locations and base the level of 
viability supplements on actual costs 
• the possibility of a subsidy to facilities in lower socioeconomic and remote communities in 
addition to the existing viability supplements to meet the difference between the 
accommodation payments that are possible in metropolitan regions and those in RRR 
locations 
• investigate the possibility of structural changes to services in RRR such as consolidation of 
providers, contracting out management to experienced providers, expansion of the MPS 
model in rural and remote locations 
• basing the supplements for RRR services on a model similar to that used by DEEWR model of 
funding lower socioeconomic communities 
o provide some block funding for some facilities in defined locations or providing services 
to defined groups 
• provide incentives to RRR providers to improve efficiency and viability through the adoption 
of new systems and practices e.g. IT,  
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Appendix 1 
Table 13 Summary of major recent and significant reports on the viability of the residential aged care industry (Chronological order) 
Author, name of 
report and year 
Intent of the report Method and sample 
etc. 
Summary of findings/ recommendations 
(Hogan 2004) Review 
of pricing 
arrangements in 
residential aged care 
To  




with respect to 
future 
arrangements 













more places into 
the system  
 examine how to 
develop a largely 
deregulated, 
market-oriented, 
The review  
 collected and 
analysed financial 
data from providers 
of RAC 














role of markets in 
aged care and 
expectations about 
future demand and 
supply 




 Four principles should drive reform: quality, equity, efficiency and 'sustainability'. 
15
   
 Nationally, (based on 2002 data) only 71% of 'services' had a 'positive' EBITDA, with the 
average 4th quartile provider reporting negative returns. 
 Modelling revealed significant level of 'technical inefficiency' with 'scope for a reduction of 
17% in input usage while maintaining the same output levels.'  
 Inefficiency was concentrated in: 
o the NFP sector (although Hogan emphasised that 'efficiency' did not necessarily equate 
with 'best practice) 
o rurality and remoteness due to higher labour costs and government policy commitments to 
equity 
o higher amenity 
o more beds per room, due to older age of such facilities 
o high respite provision  
o CALD and Indigenous focused services 
o low proportion of concessional residents. 
 'scale inefficiency' (services too small for optimal efficiency) produced scope for a further 
reduction of 7% in input usage while maintaining the same output levels.  
 the development of a mature deregulated market-appropriate price signals would be more 
responsive and produce savings for consumers, providers and governments. 
 A WACC of 10.9% post tax and 10.0% pre-tax would attract investment into RAC 
Recommendations 
 bond debts to be guaranteed by government through an industry funded levy (to an amount 
determined by actuarial advice), 
 increased Viability Supplement (based on the inability of R&R services to capitalise through 
bonds) 
 isolate 'accommodation stream' income [capital funds] from operational income, choice at all 
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 'Sustainability is used throughout Hogan's Review. The word 'viability' does not appear. 




Author, name of 
report and year 
Intent of the report Method and sample 
etc. 
Summary of findings/ recommendations 
'mature industry' 



















quality of care, 





care, and potential 
funding options for 
residential and 
community care. 
entry levels for all non-concessional incoming permanent residents between a fully refundable, 
no retentions bond or a daily accommodation charge calculated to match returns on bonds, 
 scrapping of the 40% concessional resident rate, with one concessional accommodation 
supplement payment rate for all concessional residents  
 that the existing pensioner rental assistance payment (accessed by those receiving care at 
home) be substituted for the  'pensioner supplement', thus enabling the government's 
contribution to an accommodation payment to be uniform and transferable between at-home 
care and residential care.   
 a 'contracting agency to act on behalf of government' to 'secure the most effective prices and 
arrangements (including minimum and maximums bonds) based on benchmarking against the 
most efficient providers 'so as to secure gains from productivity to benefit taxpayers and 
residents'. 
 the consumer to be 'granted' an authority/voucher to spend an agreed amount (with 
assistance of case managers/agents if required, and assuming a high level of information and a 
duty of care) 'on care and accommodation' through the provider of their choice, 




Department of Health 
and Ageing 2010) 
Technical Paper on 
costs, revenue and 
productivity trends in 
residential care, 
prepared to assist the 
PC Inquiry 'Caring for 
This paper assessed 
data on recent cost 
and revenue 
growth trends in 
the residential care 




made by efficient 
The analysis was based 
on labour cost indices, 
non-labour cost 
indices, unit cost 
indices and revenue 
components to track 
typical trends in 
residential care costs 
and revenues. 
This paper challenged the industry's claims that provider returns have fallen in recent years. It 
indicates that, to 2010, aged care revenue in all but low care had outstripped rises in aged care 
costs since the introduction of ACFI, due largely to significant improvements in labour 
productivity (based primarily on competency inflation (nurse to PCs). 




Author, name of 
report and year 
Intent of the report Method and sample 
etc. 
Summary of findings/ recommendations 
Older Australians' providers, to 
determine the 
relative rates of 





Caring for Older 
Australians, Report 
No. 53, Final Inquiry 
Report, 
This Overview 
report does not 
comment on 
provider viability 
beyond the above 
statement. 
Based on submissions 
from providers, 




issues for providers 
only in a systemic 
framework: in relation 
to price constraint 
mechanisms, 
difficulties in obtaining 
finance to build new 
beds, and financial 
inequities between 
home and residential 
care (p.xxi). 
The commission advocated the 'opening up of supply' through the removal of supply-side limits' 
on residential beds and community care services, while maintaining quality standards and 
provider accreditation (p.xxix) and retaining supported care ratios across regions (p.xxxvii). The 
distinction between high and low care would be removed. 'The price paid to providers for care 
services (by way of user co-contributions and public subsidies) should be set by the government 
at a level which meets the cost of efficiently delivering approved aged care services' (p.xxxiv-xxxv) 
taking account of 'a reasonable return on equity to maintain and build new facilities' (p.xxxv-
xxxvi). Market forces will ensure that 'the price of accommodation would be reflective of its 
value, rather than of the wealth of the consumer' (p.xxxvi), and enable competing providers to 
offer a range of accommodation, 'from a basic standard to very high quality' (p.xxxvi). 
Commented on systemic costings, rather than individual provider sustainability/viability and 
noted (after Hogan 2004) that 'aged care providers could be around 17 per cent more efficient if 
they were to operate at the most efficient level (recognising that it is not possible to have all 
services operating at this level)' and that 'costs could be reduced by a further 7 per cent by 
making structural adjustments that improved the scale efficiency of the sector' (v.1, ch 6, p.7-8). 
(Deloitte Access 
Economics 2011a) The 
viability of residential 
aged care providers 





changes to the aged 
care system 
to analyse whether 
the changes to 
residential aged 
care funding and 
regulation 
recommended by 
the PC will provide 
a sustainable 
financial base for 
the industry into 
the future (p.i). 
They used public data 
sources of data, a 





viability modelling was 
based on the income 
streams available to 
providers and costs 
 A brief discussion about the viability of at-home care under the PC future was general and 
inconclusive. The report called for the inclusion of all cost factors (including land and the cost 
of capital) when linking income streams to 'the cost of supply' lest income streams go into 
negative spiral. 
 Under the current arrangements high care services have a lower rate of return than the WACC 
on all possible building life spans (20, 25 and 30 years) and low care facilities had a slightly 
higher rate of return but were only viable on a 30 year building life span.  
 They asserted that the PC recommendations would increase average bond amounts, causing a 
decline in bond numbers, and lead to a predominant 'cash flow model' of operation across 
residential care (p.iv), resulting in higher cost of commercial capital (p.iv). 
 Using the PC recommendations (removal of distinction between high and low care, removal of 
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'The industry [is] 
defined as 
sustainable or 
financially viable if 
it [is] able to attract 
new capital' 
(sufficient to meet 
future 
demand)(p.29).   
benchmarking under 
the PC proposed 
changes (p.i). Various 
sensitivity analyses 
were applied.  
The principal 
benchmark matrix was 
the average cost per 
day of providing 
accommodation for 
low and high care 
supported residents 
[assuming separate 
income streams for 
each] based on the 
initial PC '2-bed room 
with shared bathroom' 
standard, with regional 
cost variations and 
taking account of 
different FP and NFP 
tax regimes (using a 
Capital Asset Pricing 
Model-Weighted 
Average Cost of Capital 
[CAPM-WACC] model) 
(p.i). 
bond retentions in low care) a breakeven daily accommodation charge of between $61.37 and 
$94.35 based on the estimated WACC (see tables below for more details) 
 they recommended that vulnerable residential care providers be buffered by transition 
arrangements over 10-15 years, to prevent 'cataclysmic' disruption to the system:  
o grandfathering arrangements with highly bond-dependent low care providers 
o reduced supported accommodation quotas for smaller providers (p.vi)  
 
 
A banker's view of the 
aged care reform 
(Gates & Grayson 
2012)  
ANZ Banker Richard 
Gates identified 
positives and 
negatives in the 
Gates' based the 
conference 
presentation on ANZ 
analysis of the 
He predicted an expansion of 8,000-10,000 beds a year and maintenance and refurbishment of 
existing beds with an annual investment into the industry of $2.0b annually, and $5b 'revolving 
investment'.
16
 Increased income streams as a result of the reforms will include: 
 additional $20/day accommodation supplement for provision in new or substantially 
                                                          
16
 'Revolving investment' defined by J.M Keynes as 'a revolving fund of a more or less constant amount, one entrepreneur having his finance replenished for the purpose of a 
projected investment as another exhausts his on paying for his completed investment' enabling a sustained level of economic activity supported by a constant stock of money'. 
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reforms in relation 




refurbished facilities from 1/7/2014; 
 retention of bed licenses combined with reduction of residential care allocation to 80 places 
per 1000 persons over 70 years per region and removal of low/high care distinction should 
raise demand for available beds and improve occupancy rates in medium term; 
 DoHA's estimate of a 50% increase in bonds (or equivalent periodic payments) for 
accommodation for new incoming High Care residents, 
 legitimate optimising of ACFI claiming - at September 2012 Gates noted a trend of 'for profit' 
providers to 'more efficiently optimise ACFI claiming' than NFPs, resulting in 'a significant uplift 
in Government revenue per bed', as a result of which providers 'were able to invest in 
additional staffing and invest in infrastructure'.  
He particularly emphasised the need for providers to develop improved financial management 
and transparent capital expansion planning to entice investors. 
He noted that  
 with real ACFI growth limited to 2.7% pa., and an 'average revenue loss' (COPO deferral + ACFI 
revalidation) of 4.2%, the 'capital strike' continued as of late 2012 with $3.5b of projects on 
hold.  
 The estimated 50% increase in bonds is countered by loss of bond retentions (average $3,800 
pa) and need to insure every new bond (at a rate of 1% of bond value ($2,000 pa) Removal of 
the 25% 'clawback' of Extra Service fee; 
 Concern that bond values will be reduced below current levels. 
He recommended that: 
 ACFA required approval of bond values should be limited to those exceeding around 75% of 
LGA average house price in a region, and for relatively high periodic payments (relative to 
incomes that could be earned from retained real estate) to protect lump sum bonds.  
 Close management and documentation of liquidity by providers during the transition period, 
and the separate reporting of different income/cost streams and cost centres, and with 
EBITDAR 'to be restated to recurrent cash flow'.17  
 transparent capital expenditure forward planning for potential investors, including analysis of 
impact of reforms on individual businesses. 
He concluded that while the transition stage will be tough, that 'excellence in management will 
                                                          
17 To a lay person, the variation in these financial definitions and methodologies is astounding: Carlyle's 'dismal science' is also an 'inexact science'. 
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be the key' to positive outcomes in the longer term (beyond 2015-16). 
(Ansell, Dovey & Vu 
2012) Australian Cost 
of Residential Aged 
Care Research Service 
Costs in Modern 
Residential Aged Care 
Facilities 
The objective of 
the research was to 
determine the 
income and costs 
(capital + 
operational) 
associated with the 
delivery of RAC 
services by an 
efficient operator 
in a typical, modern 
operating 
environment. Data 
was based on a 
sample of providers 





reflect the industry  
The total cost = cost of 
capital + cost of 
operational services. 
Key cost drivers were 
identified and 
baselines established 
against top two 
quartile cost regimes. 
Capital charge 
modelling utilised the 
aggregated capital cost 
of new facilities and 
the provider's WACC; 
ranging from 10.94% 
to 12.98%. 
Data analysis was 
complemented by 
consultations with 
providers and site 
visits to validate cost 
components. 
The study found that across the sector returns generated by even the most efficient operators of 
modern facilities are insufficient to justify new investment on normal commercial grounds.   
This study found that modern single-bed/room facilities are substantially unviable. The result is a 
disincentive to build new facilities (except for 'extra service environments'). 
The average EBITDAR for the sample for year ending June 2010 for HC facilities was $6,726 per 
bed year; for mixed care facilities $4,896 (p.6). The average EDITDAR for top quartile facilities was 
$12,830 per bed year (p.25). 
'To achieve the required rate of return on this level of investment, a target EBITDAR range of 
$25,225 to $32,204 per bed per annum is required. This target was not achieved by any of the 
facilities in the survey' (p.7).  
The average aggregate capital cost (including construction and commission costs, land costs and 
fit out) was $225,900 per bed at 25 years (p.7). 
The average personal care cost component for surveyed HC facilities was 3.5% above the 
efficiency baseline price. For Mixed care facilities the average operational cost was 4.8% above 
the efficiency baseline price (graph p.27). 
The report identified an annual investment gap per bed/year of from $16,200 (mixed care/no 
tax/50% bonds = $44.38/day) to $22,571 (high care taxable = $61.84/day) (p.7 and 32). 
Mixed care level facilities produced lower EBITDAs, facilities that were part of a group achieved 
higher returns, the most efficient size of homes was in the 76-100 bed range.  
David Kemp, ACSA: 




Equivalence of Lump 





to industry viability 
put to the industry 
by the Aged Care 
ACSA conducted a 
round-table of industry 
experts, consulted 
relevant published 
papers and sought 
responses to the ACFA 
questions from 
Kemp argued that 
 current rates of return for efficient providers are reported in the range 3.4% to 6.7% which is 
well below the 10% -12% rate of return range considered necessary by industry experts to 
cover the cost of capital and to ensure future investment: 'some suggest 15%' is required [p.4]  
 that the accommodation supplement (proposed by ACFA in 2012) of $52.84 for supported 
residents in facilities 'significantly refurbished' after April 2012 would not cover the real cost of 
accommodation [p.3] 
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 'efficiency' is constrained by regulation, location, size, quality of the built form and layout, past 
decision-making practices, target population, availability of staff; that across the board, 
Australian aged care is rated as highly efficient [p. 6], hence there is limited scope for 
productivity gains to be derived from consolidating smaller providers, or from other 
restructuring (p. 6, after National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission 2009 & PC 2008). 
 ACSA's view was that efficiency is independent of what should be a reasonable rate of return 
on capital investment, which should be 12% at a minimum [p.6.] to ensure sustained 
investment in the residential aged care.  
 Equivalence between bonds and periodic payments must be established and maintained. ACFA 
should publish a schedule of equivalences to ensure transparency for consumers, providers and 
investors. 
 The price of a room within any facility should be a matter for public access and providers 
should be able to negotiate prices downward from publicised prices in response to local 
markets and/or local mission.  
 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) was suggested as an appropriate methodology for ensuring that 
lump sum accommodation payments and periodic payments are financially equivalent for 
providers. The appropriate discount rate would be pre‐tax WACC. A uniform nominal pre‐tax 
WACC should be estimated for the residential aged care sector [p.6.]  
 Continuation of retention amounts: to offset the loss of interest that would otherwise be 
earned on a full bond.  
 the present bond guarantee scheme is an effective low cost form of insurance, commensurate 
with the actual level of risk associated with bond repayment defaults, and should be retained.  
 Foregone incomes to providers now accounted in retention amounts and interest on bonds 
should be accounted for in equivalence calculations [p. 10] 
 ACFA should give providers some discretion in the rates they set for individual beds, taking 
account of the cost of land and building, variable room qualities and room-sharing 
arrangements, the NFP mission of cross-subsidisation of residents who cannot afford full 
payment, and a reasonable rate of return after costs. 
 A national, indexed "threshold" of $500,000 should be set, above which an ACFA approval 
would be required. Below that level no ACFA approval should be required. Residents would still 
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The paper stated 
LASA's position on 
accommodation 
payments in 





The paper outlines 
LASA's general 
positions rather than 
making a case for any 
particular level of 
accommodation 
payments or WACC. 
The Grant Thornton 
paper listed above was 
attached to this 
submission, so we can 
assume the analysis is 
based on that paper. 
LASA advocates that:  
• Aged care accommodation prices should be referenced to wider residential market 
prices in the service catchment with material deviation triggering a review from the regulatory 
authorities (p.4); 
• Alternative funding arrangements will be necessary to encourage investment in new 
facilities and sustain existing services in in rural and remote locations (p.4) 
• Any move to reduce bond values from current levels would tend to increase provider 
WACC’s and the returns required from operations to achieve viability (p.5) 
 Historically, efficiency analysis has focused on EBITDA which, paradoxically, rates older, 
high density aged care facilities with multi bed wards as the most efficient operating 
environments.  
 Modern, single ensuited rooms are naturally more costly to operate and tend to 
produce the lowest financial returns. 
 Efficient prices should be based on a 'market based accommodation payment model' 
(p.7) and should reflect the resources necessarily consumed to deliver high quality and culturally 
appropriate services to defined user groups in modern, contemporary accommodation. 
 Prices should  
• take account of the inherent limitations associated with regional and remote locations, 
scale limitations, resident support needs and other impediments to optimal service 
efficiency, and support relevant providers with block funding models;  
• take account of the resources required to avoid unnecessary hospital transfers; and  
• the adequacy of viability supplements must be reviewed (p.5-6, 9). 
 
Starting with a lump sum is central to financial equivalence for providers. (p.7) 
• Capital and periodic payments must be linked to the quality and form of accommodation 
provided and this often varies within a facility (p.9).  
• The price of variable accommodation options should respond to market based pricing 
structures (p.9). 
 
• The application of the WACC is the relevant methodology for ensuring that accommodation 
payments and periodic charges are financially equivalent for providers (p.7).  
• Risk factors, such as the “cooling off period” (which should be limited to 7 days) should 
require an increase in the WACC percentage rate (p.7). 
• The retention system must remain until the five year review (p.7). 
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• LASA rejected the proposed bond insurance scheme (with an indicative cost of insuring bonds 
in the range of 1% to 3%) arguing instead for continued Government underwriting of bond 
exposure (p.8). Failing that, LASA calls on Government to develop an industry wide schemes 
that will minimise premium costs for consumers (p.8). 
• In the transition to a market responsive pricing system, consumers should be protected from 
uncompetitive pricing by: 
• The government setting an accommodation price upper benchmark based on local 
prices.  
• bonds at higher than benchmarked levels, should be approved by the regulating 
authority (p.10). 
• For rural providers, or in other instances where real estate benchmarks are not relevant, 
the provision of minimum, cost-based parameters correlated to other [unidentified] funding 
mechanisms would be required to ensure that returns do not fall below the WACC (p.11). 
 




Department of Health 
and Aged Care (2012a) 
This is the DoHA's 
own assessment of 
the impact both on 
future national 
finances and on the 
forward provision 
of aged care by the 
aged care industry, 
of the proposed 
reforms. It was 
released shortly 
after the release of 
the final PC report.   
The paper provides 
analysis of the 'global' 
impacts of the 
proposed reforms, 
focusing on national 
budgetary projections 
and nation-wide future 
provision of care 
issues. Most of the 
demographic and 
budgetary data is 
reiterative, but the 
'impact analysis' for 
both Home Care and 
residential care 
(Section 5.2 & 6.2) is of 
relevance to 
considerations of 
NB: The maximum accommodation charge of $50/day suggested in this internal DoHA RIS of April 
2012 is significantly below levels now under discussion. No WACC value is put forward. However, 
the import of the paper is its clear advice to government that there are real risks to investment in 
the industry if these levels are set too low, with significant consequences for future national 
accounts and policy outcomes]. 
DoHA estimates that: 
 there was (in 2012) unmet need for 30,000 to 50,000 community care places  
 declining occupancy levels in residential care since 2002 for low care 
 demand for high care places and the levels of frailty of new residential entrant is 
increasing, leading to a higher than predicted increase in ACFI cost of 7% per annum 
since 2008 
 an extra 82,500 places are required over the next decade, entailing an investment of 
$17b,  
 the existing 'accommodation payment and [other] funding arrangements' do not 
provide sufficient incentive for investors and providers to support that level of 
expansion.  
 despite the rapid growth of ACFI costs, 'workforce wages have not kept pace with the 
general increase in provider revenues and profitability' (p.65). 
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industry viability. The 'Impact Analysis' considered 3 options: 
 status quo; 
 PC reform program;  
 a partially regulated reform program as outlined in DoHA's own submission to the PC. 
The Department argued that the PC proposals of relaxed supply of community care places there 
would be a substantial increase in the number of places with potential problems in relation to 
care quality, governance and financial sustainability to a rapidly expanding sector. the 
Department proposed: 
 to retain supply-side restrictions,  
 to raise the planning ratio from 25 to 45 home care places  
 a more simplified means testing ( 
 support slower growth than the PC recommended in the number of places enabling 
providers to better prepare for the expansion of the sector 
 one-off funding to assist providers with accounting and IT upgrades 
The overall DoHA preferred option would cost the Government around $426 over five years' 
partially offset by a reduction in spending on residential care (p 34). 
For residential care the Department’s preferred option was: 
 a maximum accommodation payment of $50/day (p.42)  
 accommodation charges/bonds reflecting the cost of accommodation 
 ACFA will ensure that accommodation bonds and charges will be set at a level to attract 
investment (p.47)  
 for accommodation prices to be set after consultation with the industry and with 
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Report on the 
residential aged care 
sector: Current state 
and potential impacts 





paper to the ACFA 
(KPMG) Inaugural 
Report (30 June 
2013) establishes 
baseline data on 
the aged care 
sector and a 
framework to 
assess the impact 
of changes to the 
financial 
arrangements 
under LLLB (p.8). 
KPMG's 'Scenario 
Analysis' paper ( 
May 2013) is the 
third of this set. 
This report 
summarises up-to-date 




returns from providers 
(DoHA series), and the 
Report on the 
Operation of the Aged 
Care Act 1997 (DoHA 
2012) and data 
projections of the 
National Health and 
Hospitals Reform 
Commission and the 
ABS (p.71); as such it 
partially reiterates the 
other KPMG 2013 
reports, but also 
presents newly 
modelled results from 
the series. 
KPMG modelling finds that 'growth in operational aged care places seems to be keeping pace 
with population growth' and changed demand towards high care (p. 12), and that: 
 Increased price transparency 'may mean that some people pay a DAP when they would 
have otherwise paid a RAD.'  
o This 'may reduce the value of new RADs from low and ES residents by $402.8 million 
in 2014-15' (p.11). 
o However, RADs for High Care will provide HC providers with 'the opportunity to 
increase their lump sum accommodation payments, by $3.4 billion, resulting in 
'increased income and avoided cost of debt from new RADs and DAPs from high care 
residents' of $93.5 million in 2014-15 (p.11) with further income benefits thereafter 
(p.12). 
 Low care providers, small providers, RRR providers, and providers with a high 
proportion of supported residents will not significantly benefit from these 
changes (p.12). 
 KPMG estimate that one-third of potential RADs will shift to DAPs in 2014-15 (p. 
46), but this will largely depend on whether the unsold family home can 
generate rental income sufficient to cover the DAP (p.47). 
 Removal of retentions may reduce income from low and ES residents by $68.4 million in 
2014-15 
o providers are permitted to increase the price of accommodation (RADs and 
DAPs) to compensate for this loss of income from reduced RAD balances, 
including for 'increased cost of debt' (p.11). 
 Draw downs on RADs effectively 'removes the cap on prescribed retention amounts' 
(p.11) by allowing incoming residents to give permission for amounts to be drawn down 
from the lump sum RAD. 'The draw down arrangement [section 52J-7 of the LLLB Bill 
2013] allows the provider to be compensated for any loss of income or increased cost of 
debt from a reduced RAD balance', and 'where residents cannot pay the published RAD' 
(p.51). 
 Level 2 pricing threshold for accommodation payments may hold down accommodation 
prices when the 'value of the room' does not see permission granted by the ACPC to 
price above that threshold.  
o Approximately 13.3% of 2011-12 bonds valued at $303.6 million would have 
exceeded that level (p.48). KPMG did not model the impact as Level 3 
guidelines were not finalised, but argues that this may see 'an increased need 
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for commercial debt or equity' (p.11).  
 Extra Service: [under terms still to be clarified] residents in any part of a residential 
facility may enter into Extra Service fee agreements. The former 25% 'clawback' on the 
care subsidy will no longer apply (p.51). 
 Viability supplements to smaller RRR providers were increased in 2012 (p.52). 
 
Sustainability - the Impact of LLLB reforms on longer term provision and investment in the 
Sector: 
 Net increase in value of new RADs from 2014-15 will support greater investment 
activity, but this will differ according to individual provider circumstances (p.13) 
 Overall investment in new residential aged care building stock (which was in significant 
decline from 2009), has started to increase with new building work in progress 
increasing by 11.6%, upgrading work increasing by 60.3% between 2010-11 and 2011-
12, and rebuilding work increasing by 18% since 2009-10 (p.16).  
o [Figures and the 'traffic light' table at pp.71-74 indicates that while the slump in 
building extended into work completed during 2011-12, the turn-around into 
growth is evident in the figures for work in progress at the end of the year 2011-
12: 'Estimated new building work completed during the year decreased by 
28.7% in the last year alone'; 'rebuilding work completed during the year ... 
almost halv[ed] from $184m to $93m over the same period' and upgrade work 
completed during the year  ... more than halved from $546 million [in 2007-8] 
to $255 [in 2011-12].' However, the 'traffic light' Table 7.1 (p. 72) indicates a 
very recent 'green light' upturn in new building, rebuilding, and upgrading 
works in progress at the end of the year 2011-12.  
o In monetary terms, in the 12 months to April 2013 total value of aged care 
building work was $1.2 billion compared to $823 million in the previous year 
(an increase of 45%) (p.16).  
Investment Gap 
KPMG averaged investment in new facilities and rebuilding for the five years 2007-8 to 2011-
12 inclusive, and obtained an average figure of $997 million/annum. Were that level of 
investment to be retained each year for the decade 2012-13 to 2021-22, there would be 'a 
projected investment gap of $15.0 billion across the decade equating to around 80,000 places 
(p.16): 'If investment in residential care does not change, the demand for residential care has 
the potential to outstrip supply in the near future' (p.73). 
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Scenario Analysis of 
Selected LLLB Financial 
Arrangements. Interim 
Report (KPMG 2013b) 
The purpose of the 
report is to help 
inform ACFA 
develop a response 
to the Minister for 
Health and Ageing 




Aged Care bills. 
The focus of the 
report is on 
residential care.  
The model takes 
into account 
changes to means 
testing 
arrangements 
whereby the RAD 
will be included as 
an assessable 
asset.  
The model assess a 
resident’s decision to 
choose either a RAD, 
DAP or a combination 
of both based on the 
assumption that the 
resident will choose 
the option that 
maximises wealth. The 
model was built to 
estimate impacts on 
low and extra services 
care and high care.  
The results relate to an 
estimated change in 
the first year of the 
new financial 
arrangements (2014-
15). There will be 
impacts in subsequent 
years as new people 
enter residential care 
and replace current 
residents. However, 
owing to data 
limitations these 
effects have not been 
modelled. 
Results from the scenario analysis suggest that: 
 due to changes to the means test for assessable assets there may be an incentive for 
residents to choose a DAP over a RAD (where the sale of the (exempt) house is required 
to pay the (exempt) RAD) as an increase in accessible wealth may result in an increase to 
daily care costs 
 about 33% of current RAD consumers will switch to a DAP and these will most likely be 
those with RADs of less than $200,000 
 increased pricing transparency may reduce the value of new RADs from low and extra 
services residents by $402.8 million in 2014-15, with these RADs shifting to DAPs 
 removal of prescribed retention amounts may reduce income associated with new RADs 
from low and extra services residents of up to $68.4 million in 2014-15, assuming that 
providers currently retain the maximum permissible amount from all bonds 
 the value of new RADs from high care residents is estimated to increase by $3.4 billion in 
2014-15 and this estimated increase in incomes is more than enough to offset predicted 
losses from transfers from RADs to DAPs in low and ‘extra service’ places (p.13, main 
p.47) 
 high care providers 'will be able to increase their income and reduce the cost of debt' 
(main p. 48) and the reforms will also 'provide greater access to lump sum payments' 
across the whole service system (main p.47) 
 there will be a significant increase in persons paying accommodation charges above the 
maximum government accommodation subsidy of $52.84 (from virtually no one to 
about 36%. p. 48).  
Impacts not tested due to limited data;  
 significant refurbishment issue (who gets and who does not) 
 the extent to which residents will generate their DAP by drawing downs on their RAD 
 extra service 'clawback' (the 25% previously cut into care subs, but no longer (p.25), so 
this is a plus) 
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Inaugural Report on 
the Funding and 
Financing of the 
Aged Care Sector 
(Aged Care Financing 
Authority 2013) 
The purpose of the 
report is to provide 
an independent 
picture of the 
current state of the 
aged care industry to 
serve as a baseline 
for future analysis, 
and to offer some 
initial (predictive) 
assessment of the 
possible impacts of 
the reformed aged 
care financing 
arrangements 
(taking effect on 1 
July 2014) on 'sector 




The report Aims to 
identify priorities for 
future research and 
key issues for 
analysis in next 12-
24 month 
timeframe. It focuses 
mainly on residential 
care and refers only 
briefly to the Home 
Care sector and to 
the HACC program. 
The report is based 
primarily on KPMG 
Scenario Analysis of 
selected LLLB financial 
arrangements (May 
2013) commissioned 
by ACFA (p.15) and 
based on General 
Purpose Financial 
Reports (GPFRs) 
covering 99% of 
residential care places 
(p.15). The ACFA 
Inaugural report 
broadly outlines 
current state of sector 
finances (pp. 18-23), 
before discussing 
'Sector Viability' in 
terms of Net Profit 
Before Tax (NPBT), 
EBITDA, and trends in 
revenue and expenses' 
against type of 
ownership, type of 
care, location and size 
of provider, sources of 
finance and investor 




Recent data from the ABS shows positive signs of increasing investment' across small and large 
building projects, with 'the total value of building approvals trending upwards since LLLB', with 
February 2013 having the highest total approvals since 2006 (p. 10, 38). 
The key features of the LLLB that will impact on sector viability are: 
 removal of High Care daily payments cap  
 the introduction of RAD in high care (p.11, 40), 
 50%+ increase in accommodation supplements for supported residents in new and 
significantly refurbished homes (p.11, 40) 
 impact of changes will vary with business models and financial structures (p.11, 42). 
In aggregate, the industry will receive: 
 $3.4 billion increase in RADs in High Care (despite a $403m decrease in LC and Extra 
Service RADs) 
 $93m increase in provider income in high care due to removal of price caps 
 $68m decrease due to loss of retentions, possibly offset by higher payments enabled by 
combined RAD + DAP arrangements that people may 'choose' to make (p.40). 
Sector sustainability will require government action on 'those segments of the market which are 
operating below their cost of capital ... where lenders may not be willing to provide finance to 
renew obsolete infrastructure' (p.66). 'Efficiency gains' (eg 'technology and adjustments in work 
practices') will make investment more attractive. 'Funding and financing arrangements [should] 
encourage efficient providers rather than support inefficient providers' (p.66). 
 
Some section of the industry will have to make 'better' use of their strong equity positions; 
especially the NFP sector and investment performance .and ‘the calibre and track record of 
management teams' will be crucial factors in securing investment (p.68). 
 
ACFA predicts positive investment into the industry in general, driven by strong demand for care 
places and increased funding directed to the industry through the LLLB reforms (p.67), but 
different segments will be differently attractive to investors. 
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